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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that civil marriage and democracy are inherently
incompatible, whether assessed from a transcultural perspective that
reduces them to their most universal aspects or a culturally situated per-
spective that accounts for their uniquely American elaborations. Across
virtually all cultures, civil marriage privileges sexual partners by offering
them exclusive access to highly desirable government benefits, while
democracy presupposes liberty and equality. When governments privi-
lege sexual partners, they effectively deprive their citizens of liberty by
encouraging them to enter sexual partnerships rather than self-
determining based on their own preferences; they effectively deprive
their citizens of equality by establishing insidious status hierarchies.
While some deprivations of liberty and equality are justified-for exam-
ple, those offset by substantial benefits to social welfare-this Article
argues that deprivations of liberty and equality resulting from civil mar-
riage are emphatically unjustified. The incompatibility that exists on a
transcultural level is magnified when one considers civil marriage and
democracy in their American elaborations. American civil marriage priv-
ileges not only sexual partners but also religious, patriarchal, and
hererosexist ideologies, whereas American democracy presupposes re-
spect for the Due Process, Equal Protection, Establishment, and Free
Speech Clauses.
Even if American civil marriage could be stripped of its religious,
patriarchal, and heterosexist aspects, it would remain an essentially un-
democratic institution due to its inherent privileging of sexual partners.
Inasmuch as American civil marriage cannot be democratized, this Arti-
cle argues that it should be abolished. It does not, however, propose (as
some have) that the institution be replaced by a relatively analogous
"civil union" regime. It instead proposes that states remove themselves
entirely from the business of affirming sexual partnerships. It explains
that abolishing civil marriage would not only enhance American democ-
racy, it would also enable states to allocate governmental benefits more
appropriately. It should be emphasized that this Article applies only to
civil marriage and does not propose to prevent sexual partners from cel-
ebrating their commitments through private ceremonies or dissolving
their relationships according to the terms of private contracts.
This Article proceeds in three parts: Part I argues that when civil
marriage and democracy are assessed according to their most universal
aspects, they are incompatible. Part II argues that when civil marriage
and democracy are assessed according to their uniquely American elabo-
rations, their incompatibility is protracted. Part III argues that since civil
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marriage cannot realistically be converted into a democratic institution,
it ought to be abolished.
I. CIVIL MARRIAGE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRACY
Civil marriage and democracy, when assessed according to their
most universal aspects, are incompatible. Across virtually all cultures,
civil marriage privileges long-term sexual partners by affording them
exclusive access to a unique set of highly desirable benefits. Antithetical-
ly, democracy is understood to require both liberty and equality. Because
civil marriage unjustifiably deprives individuals of liberty and equality
by failing to promote social welfare, the institution should be abolished.
A. Civil Marriage-Longevity, Sexuality, Partnership
Reduced to its most universal aspects, civil marriage is an institu-
tion that privileges long-term sexual partners. Longevity, sexuality, and
partnership are so central to marriage that they are indeed definitional.
Sociologist Edvard Westermark recognized the definitional nature of
longevity, sexuality, and partnership in his 1921 treatise, The History of
Human Marriage.' He defined marriage as long-term in the sense that it
creates a "durable connection;"2 as sexual in the sense that it "always im-
plies the right of sexual intercourse;"' and as entailing partnership in the
sense that "[i]t is the husband's duty ... to support his wife and chil-
dren, [and] it may also be their duty to work for him."4 Anthropologist
George Peter Murdock similarly recognized the definitional nature of
longevity, sexuality, and partnership in his 1949 treatise, Social Struc-
ture.' He described marriage as a union involving cohabitation (which
suggests at least some longevity), sexual conduct, and economic partner-
ship.
The definitional nature of these three aspects is easily illustrated:
marriage entails longevity in the sense that non-committal relationships,
1. 1 EDWARD WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE (5th ed. 1922).
2. Id. at 71.
3. Id. at 26.
4. Id.
5. STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR
How LoVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 26 (2005) (citing GEORGE P. MURDOCK, SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 2-3 (1949)).
6. Id.
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such as one-night stands, are not considered "marriages; marriage entails
sexuality in the sense that non-sexual relationships, such as long-term
friendships, are not considered "marriages;"8 and marriage entails partner-
ship in the sense that non-collaborative relationships-that is, those that
do not involve living together, sharing resources, or dividing labor-are
not considered "marriages."9 While one might propose additions to the
list of definitional aspects (e.g., marriage is procreative), only longevity,
sexuality, and partnership are accepted widely enough to be truly defini-
tional. Similarly, while one might propose subtractions from the list of
definitional aspects,"o longevity, sexuality, and partnership are each so
deeply ingrained that eliminating any one would likely prevent a mod-
ern society from referring to the resulting institution as "marriage." It
should be emphasized that because marriage's definitional aspects are the
product of both law and society, they cannot be altered without altering
both legal and social norms. Because governments do not exercise uni-
lateral control over the definition of marriage, they cannot unilaterally
alter the definition of marriage such that it no longer includes all three
definitional aspects.
Civil marriage privileges long-term sexual partners by affording
them exclusive access to a broad array of tangible and intangible bene-
fits. Its tangible benefits typically relate to matters such as taxation,
pensions, inheritances, property ownership, and surrogate decision-
making.' Its intangible benefits typically relate to status and accrue
7. Edward Westermarck characterized marriage as "a more or less durable connection
between male and female lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the
birth of the offspring." WESTERMARCK, supra note 1, at 71. While we hear media ac-
counts of very short marriages that last only days or weeks, the vast majority of first
and second marriages last at least five years. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Number, Timing,
and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 2001 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/
2005pubs/p70-97.pdf.
8. Wikipedia, a purveyor of mainstream culture, defines marriage as "an institution in
which interpersonal relationships, usually intimate and sexual, are acknowledged
.... Marriage, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriage (last visited July
10, 2010).
9. Stephanie Coontz notes, "[T]hrough most of history marriage has generally involved
a societally approved division of labor between the partners, with each sex doing dif-
ferent tasks." COONTZ, supra note 5, at 30.
10. COONTZ, supra note 5, at 26. Stephanie Coontz observes that "[o]ver the millennia
the preferred form of marriage in many cultures was that between a man and several
women." Id. at 27.
11. See Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 667, 669 (2010)
(listing "favorable treatment in tax, inheritance, and insurance status; immigration
rights; rights in adoption and custody; decisional and visitation rights in health care
and burial; [and] the spousal privilege exemption when giving testimony" as among
the rights that are relatively unique to married couples); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right
364 [Vol. 18:361
from the fact that government recognition of one's relationship inher-
ently confers an elevated legal and social status. Civil marriage's tangible
and intangible benefits are so desirable that most governments carefully
police entry into the institution to ensure that only those committed to
being long-term sexual partners have access.
B. Democracy-Liberty, Equality
Although democracy has many potential definitions, most would
agree that at a fundamental level, it is self-government by free and equal
individuals.12 Liberty and equality are thus prerequisites to democracy.
Political theorists from Aristotle" to Rawls" have recognized that citi-
zens who lack liberty and equality cannot effectively participate in
political debate." Without liberty, citizens cannot develop the diverse
identities necessary to engage in robust political debate; without equali-
ty, they cannot effectively express their diverse identities in the political
to Marry, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 2081, 2090-92 (2005). See also Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-56 (Mass. 2003) (providing a non-
comprehensive catalog of many of the tangible benefits of civil marriage).
12. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J.
313, 327 (1997) ("At the heart of the deliberative conception of democracy is the
view that collective decision-making is to proceed deliberatively-by citizens advanc-
ing proposals and defending them with considerations that others, who are
themselves free and equal, can acknowledge as reasons."). See also Josd Luis Marti,
The Epistemic Conception of Deliberative Democracy Defended Reasons, Rightness and
Equal Political Autonomy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 27,
27 (Samantha Besson & Jos6 Luis Marti eds., 2006) (citations omitted) (quoting
James Bohman, Survey Article: The Coming Age of Deliberative Democracy, 6 J. POL.
PHIL. 400, 401 (1998)) (defining democracy as "a family of views according to which
the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political de-
cision making and self-government").
13. Aristotle wrote, "For if liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be
found in a democracy, they will be attained when all persons alike share in the gov-
ernment to the utmost." ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 156 (Benjamin Jowett
trans., 1908).
14. Rawls similarly wrote, "[That citizens be] free and equal persons [is] a requirement of
absolutely first importance for an account of democratic institutions." JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at xii (rev. ed. 1999).
15. See also Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1229, 1270 (2003) ("[Tlhe preconditions for consti-
tutional democracy [include] a population with the freedom and equality to pursue
self-governance . . . ."); Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic
Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF
THE POLITICAL 67, 68 (Seyla Benhabib ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1996) ("[Democ-
racy entails] free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral
and political equals[]").
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forum. While liberty and equality, like democracy, have many potential
definitions,16 a broad definition of each is necessary to produce true
democracy.
Liberty, broadly defined, refers to the ability to determine every as-
pect of one's identity, from the most concretely physical to the most
abstractly ideological. Individuals with liberty control their bodies free
from restrictions on their movement or invasions of their privacy; they
control their associations free from constraints imposed by categories
such as race, sex, sexual orientation, religion,'" political affiliation, and
(most relevant for present purposes) marital status; 9 and they control
their ideologies free from the influence of dominant religious, political,
or other viewpoints (e.g., "marriage is a sacrament," "husbands are
breadwinners," "wives are homemakers," "heterosexuality is preferable").
Without liberty, individuals cannot self-determine according to their
own preferences and thus cannot develop (much less express) the diverse
range of ideas that is crucial to successful democratic policy-making.
Equality, broadly defined, builds upon the diverse set of identities
that liberty enables and refers to interpersonal interaction irrespective
of identity-based hierarchies.20 Individuals interact irrespective of
identity-based hierarchies when their identities-as, for example,
African-Americans, women, gays, atheists, Democrats, or (most relevant
for present purposes) married persons-are unrelated to the extent of
16. See AMARTYA SEN, Equality of What?, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353
(1982) (describing various conceptions of equality) and Lea Vandervelde, The Thir-
teenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REv. 855, 869 n.78 (2007)
(citing William Linn Westermann, Between Slavery and Freedom, 50 AM. HIsT. REv.
213, 213 (1945) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Baltimore (Apr. 18, 1864) as
saying "The world has never had a good definition of liberty[.] We all declare for lib-
erty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing.")).
17. These three aspects of liberty might be viewed as a modern elaboration of John Stuart
Mill's famous precept that "[olver himself, over his own body and mind, the individ-
ual is sovereign." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 81 (David Bromwich & George
Kateb eds., 2003) (1859).
18. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) ("Manifesting a
purpose to favor one faith over another, or adherence to religion generally, clashes
with the 'understanding, reached ... after decades of religious war, that liberty and
social stability demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of all citi-
zens ..... ).
19. 1 resist the dominant understanding that identity can only be constructed around
traits that are perceived as "immutable." I would therefore categorize not only Afri-
can-Americans and women, but also atheists or unmarried persons, as comprising
identity groups.
20. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2321-24 (1997)
(defining and distinguishing class and status hierarchies).
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their political power. Without equality, diverse ideas cannot be heard,
and the vigorous debate that is crucial to democratic policymaking can-
not occur.
There are many ways of fostering liberty and equality, and each
democratic government must determine for itself which will best serve
its own citizenry. Many human rights treaties, however, suggest that fos-
tering liberty and equality requires government recognition of positive as
well as negative rights.22 Recognizing positive rights involves promises of
government involvement, and recognizing negative rights involves pro-
tection against government involvement. While most rights have both
negative and positive aspects,23 some rights have traditionally been
viewed as predominantly negative while others have been viewed as pre-
dominantly positive. Rights against government involvement in one's
thoughts, expressions, and associations have traditionally been viewed as
negative;24 rights to government involvement in one's healthcare, educa-
tion, social security, and employment have traditionally been viewed as
positive. 25 Negative rights traditionally require government inaction,
whereas positive rights traditionally require government action.
To effectuate the broad definition of liberty discussed above, a gov-
ernment must recognize both negative and positive rights. In order to
recognize negative rights, a government must refrain from passing laws
21. In The Constitution of Status, Professor Balkin explains that an economic class is
comprised of individuals who "share a common economic interest because of their
common position in the structure of economic relations[]" whereas a status group is
comprised of individuals who share "common styles of life and common senses of
honor, prestige, or moral rectitude"-generally speaking, individuals with common
identities. Id. at 2322.
22. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 12, 1948) (recognizing all of the negative and positive rights
listed in the following passage); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316,
at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966) (recognizing all of the negative rights listed in the following
passage); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A16316, at 49 (Dec.
16, 1966) (recognizing all of the positive rights listed in the following passage).
23. It is in some sense a fallacy to label rights as positive or negative. See Fatma E. Marouf
8& Deborah Anker, Socioeconomic Rights and Refugee Status, 103 Am. J. INT'L L. 784,
787 (2009) ("[It is] now widely understood that all rights contain both positive and
negative components and that many civil and political rights require expenditure[]").
See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do
222-24 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
24. See Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. Risv. 1758,
1764-65 (2008) (categorizing the above-listed rights as "negative" and cataloging
their appearance in human rights treaties).
25. See id. (categorizing the above-listed rights as "positive" and cataloging their appear-
ance in human rights treaties).
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that prevent individuals from controlling their own identities. These
would include laws banning abortion, reifying racial categories, and
(this Article will contend) establishing civil marriage. Recognizing posi-
tive rights means passing laws that affirmatively enable individuals to
control their own identities. These would include laws guaranteeing ac-
cess to the food, clothing, housing, and healthcare necessary to control
one's body, and to the education necessary to control one's ideology. To
foster liberty, then, the government must both refrain from passing laws
that prevent self-determination, and pass laws that affirmatively enable
self-determination.
To effectuate the broad definition of equality discussed above, the
government must also recognize both negative and positive rights. In
order to recognize negative rights, a government must refrain from pass-
ing laws establishing identity-based hierarchies. These would include
laws privileging individuals with a certain sex, race, or marital status.
Recognizing positive rights requires passing laws that affirmatively ena-
ble individuals to interact without reference to identity-based
hierarchies. These would include laws preventing private employers and
businesses from discriminating based on sex, race, or marital status. To
foster equality, then, the government must not pass laws that establish
identity-based hierarchies, and must pass laws that affirmatively prohibit
discrimination based on traits that anchor identity-based hierarchies.
It should be noted that there is some tension between the defini-
tion of an ideal democracy that is set forth here and the definition of
American democracy that will be set forth in Part II. The United States
Constitution has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to protect only
some of the negative-and none of the positive-rights that have been
described as necessary to democracy.26 It has further been interpreted to
protect a positive "right to marry," which this Article argues is in conflict
with both liberty and equality.27 While it is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle to assess the extent of the disconnect between our American
democracy and an ideal democracy, the lack of complete equivalence
should be noted.
C Civil Marriage Is Incompatible with Democracy
If civil marriage offers long-term sexual partners exclusive access to
unique benefits, and if democracy requires liberty and equality for all,
26. The United States Constitution will be discussed in greater detail below. See infra
Part II.
27. See infra Part II.
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the two institutions are inherently incompatible. Civil marriage deprives
individuals of liberty and equality. While some might think these depri-
vations are justified on the basis that civil marriage ultimately promotes
social welfare, this argument fails because civil marriage is not rationally
related to the state's legitimate interest in promoting social welfare.
1. Civil Marriage Deprives Individuals of Liberty and Equality
Governments that establish civil marriage and offer long-term sexu-
al partners exclusive access to a unique set of benefits effectively deprive
their citizens of both liberty and equality; they deprive their citizens of
liberty by encouraging them to organize their lives around long-term
sexual partnerships rather than allowing them to self-define according to
their own preferences; they deprive their citizens of equality by encour-
aging them to interact within hierarchies based on their "married" or
"unmarried" identities. This section elaborates on the nature and scope
of both deprivations.
Governments that establish civil marriage deprive their citizens of
liberty by encouraging them to define their identities through marriage
rather than according to their own preferences. While entering civil
marriage may appear to be voluntary on its face, it is the only means of
accessing a unique set of highly desirable benefits. As Professor Ruthann
Robson has explained, "Because of [marriage's] tangible economic and
legal benefits, as well as the rhetoric promoting marriage in the law and
social realms, . . . we presently exist under a regime of compulsory mat-
rimony that coerces individuals, especially women, to enter into the
institution of marriage." Professor Kerry Abrams has similarly ex-
plained (though not without caveat), "Some of the rights and privileges
of marriage could indeed be construed as a bribe[.]"2' By creating these
incentives, governments actively encourage entry into marriage.
28. Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REv.
709, 734 (2002). Professor Robson develops this argument by saying:
In addition to tangible benefits, the social value of marriage sustains the ar-
guments by some same-sex marriage theorists that anything other than
marriage is less than marriage and thus unacceptable. Obviously, legally
sanctioned benefits and social approval for marriage entails corresponding
legal disadvantages and social disapproval for the unmarried. In this way,
marriage is coercive.
Id. at 778 (internal citations omitted).
29. Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rher-
oric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 31 (2009). Professor
Abrams, however, cautions that it is "far from clear that (someone] contemplating
2012] CIVIL MARRIAGE 369
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Marriage manipulates identity in both concretely physical and ab-
stractly ideological ways. On the physical level, marriage encourages
individuals to organize their lives around long-term sexual partnerships,
instead of focusing on short-term relationships, non-sexual relation-
ships, or remaining single. On the ideological level, marriage encourages
individuals to value long-term sexual partnerships over short-term rela-
tionships, non-sexual relationships, or remaining single. This results in
many individuals viewing long-term sexual partnerships as central to
their identities, crucial to their success, and integral to their sense of
self-worth. While some would self-define through long-term sexual
partnerships even without any governmental encouragement, others
would not. Governments that truly respect liberty must allow all of
their citizens to self-define according to their own preferences unless
they can justify actively manipulating their preferences.
Governments that establish civil marriage deprive their citizens not
only of liberty but also of equality by establishing a hierarchy based on
"married" or "unmarried" identities. The legal privileges that married
individuals enjoy by virtue of the unique benefits they are awarded are
social and economic in nature. Some individuals would interact as if be-
ing married were preferable even without any governmental
encouragement, but others would not. Governments that truly respect
equality must not use their power and prestige to create identity-based
hierarchies-unless they can justify those hierarchies.
2. Civil Marriage's Deprivations Are Unjustified
Democratic governments should not create or maintain institutions
that deprive their citizens of liberty and equality unless they can illus-
trate that those institutions substantially promote social welfare. Civil
marriage deprives individuals of liberty and equality, but does not sub-
stantially promote social welfare. Part 11(c)(ii) considers-and ultimately
rejects-three arguments that civil marriage promotes social welfare,
each of which corresponds with one of civil marriage's three definitional
aspects: longevity, sexuality, and partnership.o
marriage would look at the package of goodies offered by the state and conclude that
marriage is a good idea." Id.
30. While other interests may also motivate marriage, these three (privileging longevity,
sexuality, and partnership) appear to be the primary interests that are potentially ca-
pable of justifying the institution-yet, as will be illustrated, none is ultimately
sufficient.
[Vol. 18:361370
The first argument is that civil marriage promotes social welfare by
promoting longevity.3 ' This argument fails because, while civil marriage
does promote long-term partnerships,32 such partnerships do not neces-
sarily promote social welfare. Long-term partnerships can be as unhealthy
as-and, in some cases, more unhealthy than-short-term partnerships.
While it may appear that long-term partnerships provide many health and
economic benefits,33 longevity is not reliably correlated with health or
economic well-being." As sociologist Kathleen Mullan Harris observes,
some marriages are neither healthy nor economically beneficial, despite
their longevity." According to Professor Harris, "high-conflict marriage is
unhealthy for both children and adults,"" "divorce is preferable to
continuation of high-conflict marriage for children's well-being,"3 7 and
"unhappy marriages have negative physical-health consequences." 8 Lon-
gevity, therefore, does not necessarily promote social welfare. It is not
long-term relationships, but "stable, long-term relationships" that
31. See, e.g, Lois A. Weithorn, Can A Subsequent Change in Law Void a Marriage that
Was Valid at Its Inception? Considering the Legal Effect of Proposition 8 on California's
Existing Same-Sex Marriages, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 1063, 1098 (2009) (describing the so-
cial value placed on longevity within marriage). As Professor Weithorn has
recognized, all of the parties to a marriage-the spouses and the state-hope that it
will be permanent. She explains, "[b]ecause these aspirations toward permanence are
so important to society at large, marital law is structured to reinforce these expecta-
tions and to promote the durability of the relationship." Id.
32. This is clearly true of civil marriage, which is ideally "enduring[,]" Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred."), and often
quite difficult to exit, given many states' barriers to divorce. Additional evidence that
civil marriage promotes long-term relationships lies in the fact that, to date, all of the
successful same-sex marriage plaintiffs have been involved in long-term relationships.
See Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 21, 33 (2010) ("[T]he successful same-sex marriage cases were
carefully orchestrated to select plaintiffs in long term, committed, marriage-like rela-
tionships, whose personal narratives appealed to middle America."). This suggests
that civil marriage promotes and, indeed, requires-a long-term relationship.
33. See Kathleen Mullan Harris, Family Structure, Poverty, and Family Well-Being: An
Overview ofPanel2, 10 Emp. Ris. & EMP. POL'Y J. 45, 55 (2006) ("[Tlhere is simply
no doubt that stable, long-term relationships offer health, wealth, and happiness ben-
efits to adults and children. There is a vast body of research showing these benefits,
both in the United States and in other nations.").
34 Id. at 55 n.29, 57 (noting that "high-conflict marriage is unhealthy for both children
and adults" and that "[m]arriage is associated with higher incomes for men in first
marriages, but not in subsequent marriages").
35. See generally id.
36. Id. at 55 n.29.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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promote social welfare.3 1 While one might think that longevity is suffi-
ciently correlated with stability to promote social welfare by proxy, there
is insufficient evidence to establish this correlation. Professor Harris
notes that "marriage, by itself, is inadequate to significantly improve
family functioning and stability."40 The argument from longevity thus
fails on two grounds: longevity does not necessarily promote social wel-
fare, and even though stability may promote social welfare, longevity is
not a reliable proxy for stability.
The second argument is that civil marriage promotes social welfare
by promoting sexuality." This argument fails because, while civil mar-
42
riage does promote sexual activity, sexual activity does not promote
social welfare. Few would argue that engaging in sexual activity should
automatically result in governmental benefits. While one might think
that sexual activity is sufficiently correlated with child-rearing to
promote social welfare by proxy (few, if any, would dispute that child-
rearing generally promotes social welfare), there is insufficient evidence
to establish this correlation. The historically strong correlation be-
tween sexual activity and child-rearing has been substantially weakened
over the past half-century as a result of increased access to safe and legal
contraception. Recent reports indicate that in the United States alone
there are forty-three million "fertile, sexually active women who do not
want to become pregnant," and that 62% of women in their childbear-
ing years are using some form of contraception."
39. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
40. Id. But Professor Harris also says, "Cohabitational and visiting relationships are much
less stable than married relationships, and stability is associated with significant eco-
nomic, psychosocial, and educational benefits to children." Id.
41. Few would argue that sexuality directly promotes social welfare; sexuality is typically
viewed as significant by virtue of its correlation with child-rearing, which quite clearly
promotes social welfare.
42. Some evidence of this lies in the fact that entry into marriage has always been limited
to those who could, according to the social mores of their time, appropriately engage
in sexual intercourse. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(A) (West 2004) (limit-
ing marriage to unrelated, unmarried, opposite-sex adults). Additional evidence lies in
the fact that exit from marriage has traditionally been allowed when a spouse is either
unwilling or unable to engage in sexual intercourse.
43. GUTTMACHER INST., Facts on Contraceptive Use in the United States (June 2010),
available at http://www.gurtmacher.org/pubs/fb contr use.pdf ("62% of the 62 mil-
lion women aged 15-44 are currently using [some] method [of contraception]."). But
note that "[a]lmost one-third (31%) of these 62 million women do not need a meth-
od because they are infertile; are pregnant, postpartum or trying to become pregnant;
have never had intercourse; or are not sexually active." Id. Also, "Female sterilization
is most commonly relied on by women . .. who are currently or have previously been
married." Id.
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The historically strong correlation between marital sexuality and
marital child-rearing has also been substantially weakened over the past
half-century due to the increased acceptability of non-marital
child-rearing. Recent reports indicate that over twenty million married
women are using contraception and that 39.7% of all births are to un-
married women." The percentage of births to unmarried women has
increased by over five points since 2002, when it was 34%, and by over
twenty points since 1980, when it was only 18.4%.5 Also, recent U.S.
Census Bureau statistics show that many American children are current-
ly living with unmarried parents." The argument from sexuality, thus,
fails on two grounds: sexual activity does not promote social welfare,
and even though child-rearing promotes social welfare, sexual activity is
not a reliable proxy for child-rearing. As Part III will illustrate, the gov-
ernment could more effectively promote child-rearing if it abolished
civil marriage altogether.
The third argument is that civil marriage promotes social welfare by
promoting partnership, which facilitates the sharing of resources and the
division of labor." This is by far the strongest of the three arguments, yet
44. The exact number is 20,655,000. Anjani Chandra et al., Nat'1 Ctr. for Health Statis-
tics, Fertility, Family Planning, and Reproductive Health of U.S. Women: Data From
the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, CTS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PRE-
VENTION, 99 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/
sr23-025.pdf.
45. Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Non-Marital Childbearing in the United
States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 1 (May 2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/dataldatabriefs/dbl8.pdf. It is questionable whether there
is any interest in promoting procreation. Our population is growing at an annual rate
of approximately 0.96%, which is higher than many nations. The World Factbook:
Population Growth Rate (Country Comparison to the World), CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2002rank.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). Procreation is, therefore, only
worthy of state benefits to the extent that it is correlated with child-rearing. Yet, as
current child-support collection statistics (and other indices) indicate, many individ-
uals who procreate do not participate to any significant degree in child-rearing. See,
e.g., Constance M. Chesnik & Lisa A. Petersen, The Child Support Lien Docket, 74
Wis. LAw. 14, 16 (2001) ("Wisconsin has long been a leader nationwide in both es-
tablishing and enforcing child support orders. In 1999, Wisconsin collected nearly $1
billion in child support. However, Wisconsin still has almost $1.9 billion in uncol-
lected child support.").
46. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years and Marital
Status of Parents, by Age, Gender, Race, and Hispanic Origin of the Child for All
Children: 2007 (2008), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2007/
tabC3-all.xis (reporting that, of the 73,746 children studied, a significant portion-at
least 16,571 -were living with unmarried parents).
47. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in holding that the Massachusetts Con-
stitution requires same-sex marriage, seemed to presume that the government had a
legitimate interest in promoting partnership through marriage. See Goodridge v.
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it is still problematic. While civil marriage does promote partnership48
and partnership does promote social welfare, civil marriage includes so
many partnerships that are not socially desirable4 ' and excludes so many
that are socially desirableo that it is not a rational means of promoting
social welfare. A government might be justified in promoting all socially
desirable partnerships, for example, all partnerships that conserve re-
sources, increase efficiency, and promote health and well-being.
Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964-65. The state had argued that excluding
same-sex couples from marriage was rationally related to its legitimate interest in
promoting partnership, based on its assumption that same-sex couples are generally
less financially inter-dependent than opposite-sex couples. Id. (reporting that the state
argued "[t]he marriage restriction [was] rational ... because the General Court logi-
cally could assume that same-sex couples [were] more financially independent than
married couples and thus less needy of public marital benefits"). Without seriously
questioning that the state would be justified in promoting partnership, the Court re-
jected the state's argument on the basis that same-sex couples were not demonstrably
less financially inter-dependent than opposite-sex couples, id. (characterizing the
state's argument that same-sex couples were less financially inter-dependent than op-
posite-sex couples as a "conclusory generalization")-and were, indeed, likely to have
dependents. Id. (noting that the state's argument "ignore[d] that many same-sex cou-
ples ... have children and other dependents (here, aged parents) in their care"). The
court did, however, observe that the state had not actually reserved marriage for fi-
nancially inter-dependent couples, inasmuch as it did not require opposite-sex
couples to illustrate financial inter-dependence. Id. ("Massachusetts marriage laws do
not condition receipt of public and private financial benefits to married individuals
on a demonstration of financial dependence on each other; the benefits are available
to married couples regardless of whether they mingle their finances or actually de-
pend on each other for support.").
48. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964-65. As Professor John Culhane has recognized, "Of-
ten, marriage involves a decision to divide labor in a way that best accommodates
couples' mutual skills, interests, and goals." John G. Culhane, Marriage Equality?
First,Justify Marriage (If You Can), 1 DREXEL L. REv. 485, 502 (2009).
49. Marriage, for example, includes emotionally abusive relationships.
50. One could argue that most relationships that conserve resources and increase efficien-
cy, even if they are short-term or non-sexual, promote social welfare. While there is
disagreement as to what form of partnership is most efficient (e.g., gendered versus
non-gendered), there is general agreement that partnering is more efficient than not
partnering. See Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1896-97
(2000) (noting that, while "human capital theory . . . centers around the claim that a
gender-based division of labor is more efficient than one in which household partners
share both roles . .. the theory says nothing about why it should be women rather
than men who specialize in housework."). Professor Schultz provides an overview of
the debate. Id. at 1896 n.49. Economist Gary Becker reports that "[s]pecialization in
the allocation of time and in the accumulation of human capital would be extensive
in an efficient family even if all members were biologically identical." He goes on to
say, "[lIndeed, this chapter argues that biological differences probably have weakened
the degree of specialization." GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30
(1991).
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However, it is not justified in promoting only long-term sexual partner-
ships because longevity and sexuality are not independently valuable.
A government that establishes civil marriage ought to make the in-
stitution equally accessible to all of its citizens," but a truly democratic
government would not create civil marriage in the first place. Civil mar-
riage prevents individuals from developing and valuing a diverse array of
relationships and thus prevents them from voicing the diverse array of
viewpoints that is necessary to any successful democracy. Because civil
marriage deprives individuals of liberty and equality without any de-
monstrable increase in social welfare, the institution is unjustified.
II. AMERICAN CIVIL MARRIAGE IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
While tension exists between the abstract concepts of civil marriage
and democracy, an even greater tension exists between American civil
marriage and American democracy. American civil marriage privileges
not only long-term sexual partnerships but also religious, patriarchal,
and heterosexist ideologies. American democracy, in contrast, requires
adherence to the Constitution's Due Process, Equal Protection, Estab-
lishment, and Free Speech Clauses.
A. American Civil Marriage
While American civil marriage is defined by the three universal cri-
teria of longevity, sexuality, and partnership,52 its definition is glossed by
three culturally specific (and religiously motivated) criteria: permanence,
heterosexism, and patriarchy. Part II(A)(i) illustrates how American civil
marriage exhibits the three universal criteria of longevity, sexuality, and
partnership; Part II(A)(ii) explores how the institution has been influ-
enced by religion to embrace an extreme view of longevity, a heterosexist
view of sexuality, and a patriarchal view of partnership.
51. As Professor William Eskridge asserts, "A civilized polity assures equality for all its
citizens." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 10 (1996). As Professor Martha Nuss-
baum similarly asserts (within the context of a very different argument that favors
replacing civil marriages with civil unions), "[Slo long as the state is in the marrying
business, concerns with equality require it to offer marriage to same-sex couples[.]"
Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 672.
52. See supra Part I(A).
2012] 375CIVIL MARRIAGE
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
1. Longevity, Sexuality, Partnership
American civil marriage (hereinafter simply "civil marriage") exhib-
its longevity through lifetime commitments; sexuality, through
heterosexual relationships; and partnership, through patriarchal collabo-
ration.
The importance of longevity is evident from the fact that civil mar-
riage has traditionally been understood as a lifelong commitment. Many
American couples choose to solemnize their marriages by reciting wed-
ding vows that refer to marriage as enduring "until death" or even
"forevermore."" From a legal perspective, there have historically been,
and continue to be, many obstacles to obtaining a divorce. Until the
early 1970s, divorce was not possible absent proof that one of the spous-
es was at fault.54 Yet, even in the era of "no-fault" divorce, many states
retain fault-based grounds and some structure their no-fault provisions
such that exit from marriage remains relatively difficult-by, for exam-
ple, imposing requirements that couples live "separate and apart" for a
certain period of time (often at least six months) before a divorce decree
can be entered."
The importance of sexuality is evident from the fact that civil mar-
riage has traditionally been limited to couples who could "appropriately"
(according to the social mores of their time) engage in sexual inter-
53. On the MyWeddingVows website's traditional wedding vows page, variants one
through four refer to marriage as "so long as [we] both shall live" and variants five
and six refer to marriage as "till death do us part." Traditional Wedding
Vows 1, MYWEDDINGVOWS, http://www.myweddingvows.com/traditional-wedding-
vows/traditional-wedding-vows-I (last visited July 10, 2010). Michael Cobb notes
that many couples view marriage as extending even beyond death. Michael Cobb, Pi-
oneers, Probate, Polygamy, and You, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 323, 347-48 (2009) (noting
that marital relationships are "inflected by an overwhelming sense of worry about
'forever' " and that many popular wedding vows refer to marriage as "forevermore" or
"eternal").
54. Susan M. Buckholz, Two Views on Collaborative Law, 30 VT. B.J. 37, 37 (2004)
("Until the 1970s, courts in all fifty states were required to make findings of fault be-
fore a decree of divorce could be entered and the parties freed from their legal
relationship to each other.").
55. Patrick Parkinson, Family Law and the Indissolubility of Parenthood, 40 FAM. L.Q.
237, 240 n.12 (2006) (reporting that "thirty-three states still retain a fault-based di-
vorce") (citing SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAw IN AMERICA 79 (2003); Joel A.
Nichols, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust Plu-
ralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 935 n.3 4 (1998) (reporting
that "'separate and apart' statutes . . . still serve as bases for divorce in many states")
(citing, inter alia, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 103(1) (West 1997 (amended)).
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course.5 6 This has effectively limited our American institution to indi-
viduals involved in opposite-sex, non-consanguineous, monogamous,
consensual, adult relationships.57 Furthermore, statutory provisions his-
torically allowed exit from marriage upon the failure of a spouse to
engage in sexual intercourse. Exit from marriage was allowed by "di-
vorce" when one spouse refused to engage in sexual intercourse," and by
"annulment" when one spouse misrepresented his or her capacity or
willingness to engage in sexual intercourse.59
The importance of partnership is evident from the fact that married
couples have traditionally been encouraged to pool their resources and
divide their labor-often along gender lines, with husbands acting as
providers and wives, as homemakers.o Professor Reva Siegel writes about
a Kentucky judge who, in 1922, explained, "At common law the hus-
band and wife are under obligation to each other to perform certain
duties. The husband is to bring home the bacon, so to speak, and to
furnish a home, while the wife [is] to keep said home in a habitable
d ,, 61condition.
56. Often, those excluded from marriage were also prohibited from engaging in sexual
intercourse. Indeed, for much of our nation's history, interracial and same-sex
couples were both excluded from marriage and prohibited from engaging in sexual
intercourse. Similar exclusions and prohibitions still apply to incestuous couples.
57. See, e.g., Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(A) (West 2004) (limiting marriage to
opposite-sex, unrelated, monogamous, and adult couples).
58. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Ricketts, 903 A.2d 857, 863 (2006) (stating that "the statutory
term 'desertion,' as applied to husband and wife, means a cessation of the marital re-
lation" and is a ground for divorce).
59. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REv.
1625, 1680 (2007) ("Most state courts have restricted annulment for fraud to cases
involving misrepresentations that go to the 'essentials' of the marriage, defined as the
capacity or willingness to procreate or have sexual intercourse.") (citing, inter alia,
Tompkins v. Tompkins, 111 A. 599, 601 (N.J. Ch. 1920) (advising an annulment,
because the husband had not overcome the presumption of impotency that arose af-
ter three years of cohabitation with his wife without sexual intercourse)).
60. See BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Married Parents' Use of
Time Summary, 2003-06, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus2.nr0.htm (last visit-
ed July 10, 2010) [hereinafter BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Married Parents]. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics findings are detailed below, in Part I(C)(i).
61. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization ofMarital Status Law: Adjudicating Wies'Rights to
Earnings, 82 GEo. L.J. 2127, 2129 (1994) ("As [a] Kentucky court explained ... in
1922, a husband had a duty to perform market labor ('bring home the bacon'), while
a wife had a duty to perform household labor ('keep ... home').") (citing Lewis v.
Lewis, 245 S.W. 509, 511 (Ky. 1922)).
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2. Religiously Motivated Permanence,
Heterosexuality, Patriarchy
As evidenced by the above discussion, our American elaborations of
longevity, sexuality, and partnership are deeply informed by religion. Reli-
gious (and specifically Judeo-Christian) precepts have caused our
American institution to privilege not only longevity but lifetime com-
mitments, not only sexuality but heterosexuality, and not only partnership
but patriarchy. Although these religiously motivated aspects of marriage
are not entirely intractable, they cannot be readily eradicated. Tracing how
religion has influenced our American institution to privilege lifelong, het-
erosexual, patriarchal unions will help illustrate the impossibility of quick
redefinition.
While American marriage is often described as a secular institution,
its deep roots in English ecclesiastical marriage reveal its religious nature.
In England until as recently as the 1850s, marriage was within the juris-
diction of the ecclesiastical courts, which were very closely affiliated with
the Church of England.62 English marriages were "not valid unless [they
were] solemnized according to the rites of the Church of England, in
church, in the presence of a clergyman and witnesses."" While American
marriage statutes do not formally place marriage within the jurisdiction of
religious officials-except, of course, insofar as they authorize religious
64
officials to solemnize civil marriages -their implicit privileging of life-
long, heterosexual, patriarchal relationships belies their secular nature.
These three de facto requirements of lifetime commitment, heterosexu-
ality, and patriarchy are each largely motivated by religion.
Religion motivates the American understanding of marriage as not
only a long-term commitment, but a lifetime commitment. The wed-
ding vows prescribed by the Anglican Book of Common Prayer require
each spouse to pledge that he or she will remain married "until death."6
And while the Canons ofthe Anglican Church in North America do allow
for divorce,6 they make clear that marriage is ideally a "permanent" and
62. John L. McCormack, Title to Property, Title to Marriage: The Social Foundation of
Adverse Possession and Common Law Marriage, 42 VAL. U. L. REv. 461, 478 (2008).
63. Id. at 478-79.
64. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 11-c (McKinney 2011) (authorizing both civil and
religious officials to solemnize civil marriages).
65. The Solemnization of Matrimony, in BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, available at
http://www.eskimo.com/-lhowell/bcpl662/occasion/marriage.html (last visited July
10, 2010) [hereinafter BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER].
66. CANONS OF THE ANGLICAN CHURCH IN NORTH AMERICA, tit. 11, c.7, § 4, available at
http://acnaassembly.org/media/ACNA Canons_-_RATIFIED_2009-06-23.pdf
("Scripture acknowledges our fallen nature and does provide guidance to know when
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"lifelong" union. Similarly, the Catholic Code of Canon Law provides
that a marriage, once consummated, is "perpetual" and "can be dissolved
by no human power and by no cause, except death."" [nasmuch as most
Americans choose to have religious officials solemnize their marriages,
most ceremonies involve the recitation of religious vows that speak of
marriage as a lifetime commitment. 9 Even Americans who have secular
ceremonies often choose vows that are derived from the Anglican or
Catholic ceremonies and thus speak of marriage as a lifetime commit-
70
ment.
Religion motivates the American understanding of marriage as not
only a sexual union, but a heterosexual union, most often characterized
by non-consanguineous, monogamous, consensual, adult intercourse.
The Canons of the Anglican Church in North America define marriage as
the union of "one man and one woman[.]",' The Catholic Code of Canon
Law similarly provides that persons who marry "must at least not be ig-
norant that marriage is a permanent consortium between a man and a
woman which is ordered toward the procreation of offspring by means
of some sexual cooperation." 72 American marriage statutes have tradi-
tionally embraced these religious definitions. Evidence of this lies in the
fact that they have generally limited entry into marriage to opposite-sex,
unrelated, monogamous, consenting, adult couples," required consum-
mation for a marriage to be valid," and allowed exit from marriage
a marriage may be declared a nullity or dissolved and allows the possibility of a sub-
sequent marriage in certain circumstances (Matthew 19 and 1 Corinthians 7).").
67. Id. at tit. II, c.7, § 1 ("[T]he Sacrament of Holy Matrimony is in its nature a union
permanent and lifelong of one man and one woman.").
68. 1983 CODE c.1141 (explaining that marriage "cannot be dissolved by any human
power or for any reason other than death"). See alo id. -c. 1134 ("From a valid mar-
riage arises a bond between the spouses which by its nature is perpetual and
exclusive[.]").
69. Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REv. 449, 457 n.26 (2009)
(citing MARTIN KING WHYTE, DATING, MATING, AND MARRIAGE 56 (1990); Cathy
Lynn Grossman & In-Sung Yoo, Civil Marriage on Rise Across USA, USA TODAY,
Oct. 7, 2003, at lA).
70. The MyWeddingVows website's non-denominational wedding vows page includes
variants that refer to marriage as "forevermore." Non-Denominational Wedding
Vows, MYWEDDINGVOWS, http://www.myweddingvows.com/traditional-wedding-
vows/non-denomination-wedding-vows (last visited July 10, 2010).
71. CANONS OF THE ANGLICAN CHURCH, supra note 66, at tit. 11, c.7, § 1.
72. 1983 CODE c.1096, § 1.
73. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(A) (West 2004) (limiting marriage to
opposite-sex, unrelated, monogamous, and adult couples).
74. See, e.g., B v. B, 78 Misc.2d 112 (1974) (stating that "the law [provides] that physical
incapacity for sexual relationship is ground for annulling a marriage" and annulling the
parties' marriage because "defendant [could not] function as a husband by assuming
male duties and obligations inherent in the marriage relationship inasmuch as he did
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based on a failure to engage in sexual intercourse." While American
marriage statutes no longer universally retain all of these requirements
(some states now allow same-sex marriage, and virtually all now recog-
nize marriages as valid regardless of the couple's sexual practices)," even
those requirements that have been formally abolished remain central to
our understanding of marriage.
Religion also motivates the American understanding of marriage as
not only partnership-based, but also patriarchal, meaning that husbands
are privileged and wives are subordinated. Professors Eric Rasmusen and
Jeffrey Evans Stake report that "[rieligious and social norms [have long]
defined . . . the gender roles within a marriage."" English ecclesiastical
marriage was a deeply patriarchal institution" in which husbands and
wives had dramatically different rights and obligations.7 As the Anglican
Book of Common Prayer succinctly explained, "[T]he husband is the
head of the wife."so Within English marriage, husbands were both dom-
inant over and answerable for their wives."' They entered contracts and
not 'have male sexual organs[.]' "); but see Franklin v. Franklin, 154 Mass. 515
(1891) (stating that "[t]he consummation of a marriage by coition is not necessary to
its validity.").
75. See, e.g., Martin v. Otis, 233 Mass. 491 (1919) (explaining that "impotency ... ren-
der[s] a marriage . . . voidable at the suit of the party conceiving himself or herself to
be wronged.").
76. The six states that currently allow same-sex marriage are Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); S.
115, 2009 Leg., 2009-2010 Sess. (Vt. 2009); N.H. REv. STAT. 5 457:1-a (2004 &
Supp. 2010); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §§ 10-13 (McKinney 2011). Consummation is
not relevant under current marriage statutes. See LEGAL INFO. INST., Marriage Laws,
http:// topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/table-marriage.
77. Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifiing the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the
Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 500 (1998) ("In the past, ... [r]eligious and so-
cial norms defined a "marriage" and the gender roles within a marriage.").
78. Charles P. Kindregan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Culture Wars and the Lessons of Legal
History, 38 FAM. L.Q. 427, 430 (2004). The American colonies "imported most of
the substantive law of marriage created by the English Church and its ecclesiastical
courts[.]" See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND
(1765) (illustrating that marriage forced its participants into gendered roles).
79. See Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of Domestic
Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 31,
33 (2009) (cataloging the rights and obligations of married men and women).
80. BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, supra note 65.
81. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 444-45 (1765) ("The husband also (by the old
law) might give his wife moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbe-
haviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining
her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to cor-
rect his apprentices or children[J").
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12held property on behalf of their entire families. Wives, in contrast, had
no legal identity apart from their husbands, and could neither enter
contracts nor own property" The division of labor within English mar-
riage was gendered in the sense that husbands were expected to be
providers,"' and wives, homemakers." Many of the patriarchal aspects of
English marriage were imported into American marriage.86 Elizabeth
Cady Stanton expressed her frustration with this fact when she declared
in 1854, "[The] laws relating to marriage-founded as they are on the
old common law of England, a compound of barbarous uses [-] are in
open violation of our ideas of justice."" She went on to criticize Ameri-
can marriage vigorously for the patriarchal aspects it had inherited from
its English predecessor."
While early Americans could have given content to the transcultur-
al criteria of longevity, sexuality, and partnership in a variety of ways,
they chose to draw primarily on religious precepts and, therefore, to de-
fine American marriage as a lifelong, heterosexual, patriarchal union.
Some might argue that American marriage is flexible enough that it
could be redefined as a more transient, less heterosexist, and less gen-
dered institution; however, such redefinition seems unlikely in the
foreseeable future. Permanence, heterosexuality, and gender roles have
become so central to our American understanding of marriage that they
82. Siegel, supra note 61, at 2127 ("For centuries the common law of coverture gave
husbands rights in their wives' property and earnings, and prohibited wives from con-
tracting, filing suit, drafting wills, or holding property in their own names.").
83. Siegel, supra note 61, at 2127. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 442 ("By mar-
riage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband[.]"). See also Kindregan, supra note 78, at
430-31 ("In ecclesiastical law, the disability of a married woman was based on the
biblical concept that husband and wife are 'one flesh.' ").
84. The "doctrine of necessaties," indeed, required husbands to provide adequate food,
clothing, and shelter for their wives. As Blackstone reported, "The husband is bound
to provide his wife with necessities by law . . . and if she contracts debts for them, he
is obliged to pay them; but for any thing besides necessaries, he is not chargeable."
BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 443.
85. Siegel, supra note 61, at 2129.
86. Modern American marriage is gendered in both legal and practical ways. Since Part Il
focuses on the ways in which it is legally gendered, Part I focuses exclusively on the
ways in which it is practically gendered.
87. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in 1854, criticized American marriage statutes for their roots
in English common law, saying "ly]our laws relating to marriage-founded as they
are on the old common law of England [are] a compound of barbarous usages." Eliz-
abeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of the State of New York, reprinted in I
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds. 1985) (1848-
1861) 595-605.
88. Id.
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have, for all practical purposes, become definitional. Absent the highly
problematic erasure of large portions of our nation's history, American
marriage cannot be successfully redefined to exclude these three de facto
requirements.
B. American Civil Marriage Violates Due Process Rights
Civil marriage, as defined in Part II(A), violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state
shall deprive any person "of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."" This argument proceeds in two parts-Part II(B)(i) illustrates
that civil marriage prevents fully autonomous self-definition, and Part
II(B)(ii) illustrates how this translates into a deprivation of liberty under
the Due Process Clause. Part II(B)(iii) raises-and rebuts-the obvious
counter-argument that, because the Supreme Court has recognized a
fundamental "right to marry" as part of its substantive due process doc-
trine, civil marriage could not possibly violate the Due Process Clause.
1. American Civil Marriage Manipulates Identity
Civil marriage prevents individuals from fully autonomous self-
definition by encouraging them to abandon their own preferences and
adopt religious, heterosexual, and gendered identities. This section be-
gins by illustrating that civil marriage encourages the adoption of
religious identities; proceeds by illustrating that it encourages the
adoption of heterosexual identities; and concludes by illustrating that
it encourages the adoption of gendered identities.
Americans who marry are encouraged to adopt religious identities.
Because civil marriage is defined largely by reference to religious doc-
trine, those who enter the institution are implicitly expected to subscribe
to that doctrine. Social science data reveals that married Americans
generally meet this expectation." While it is unclear whether being mar-
ried leads to being religious or being religious leads to being married,"
the correlation between marriage and religion is statistically significant.
89. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
90. Frank Newport, Marriage Remains Key Predictor of Party Identification, GALLUP UJy
13, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/121571/marriage-remains-key-predictor-
party-identification.aspx.
91. One Gallup report that found a connection between marriage and religiosity cau-
tioned that it is "uncertain whether religion ... lead[s] to choice of marital status, or
whether marital status leads Americans to different . . . religious ... choices." Id.
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Recent studies indicate both that married Americans are more likely to
be religious," and that "[r]eligious people are more likely to marry."9
Despite the fact that American marriage statutes do not expressly condi-
tion marriage on religiosity, they define marriage by reference to
religious doctrine and authorize religious officials to solemnize civil
marriages.9 And even though American marriage statutes do not ex-
pressly require religious ceremonies, most Americans voluntarily elect
religious ceremonies.95 According to one report, "[r]eligious authorities
perform an estimated sixty to eighty percent of the marriages in the
United States."" Civil marriage, then, encourages-or is at the very least
highly correlated with-the adoption of religious identities.
Americans who marry are also encouraged to adopt heterosexual
identities.97 Entry into civil marriage has long been-and, in the vast
majority of states, continues to be-limited to opposite-sex, unrelated,
monogamous, consenting adults." Most American marriage statutes
contain provisions similar to the following Ohio statute:
92. Id. ("Marriage is ... associated with religious intensity, including church attendance
and importance of religion in one's life."). Interestingly, among Americans whose re-
ligious views have changed during their lifetimes, 22% report that their views
changed at least in part because they married someone from another religion. Frank
Newport, A Look at Religious Switching in America Today, GALLUP (June 23, 2006),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/23467/Look-Religious-Switching-America-Today.aspx.
93. Nigel Barber, Are Religious People More Ethical III? Sexual Behavior, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY (May 15, 2009), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-human-beast/
200905/are-religious-people-more-ethical-iii-sexual-behavior (last visited July 10,
2010). See also THE BARNA GRP., New Marriage and Divorce Statistics Released
(Mar. 31, 2008), http://www.barna.org/barna-updatelarticle/15-familykids/42-new-
marriage-and-divorce-statistics-released ("In addition to finding that four out of every
five adults (78%) have been married at least once, the Barna study revealed that an
even higher proportion of born again Christians (84%) tie the knot. That eclipses the
proportion among people aligned with non-Christian faiths (74%) and among athe-
ists and agnostics (65%).").
94. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 11 (McKinney 2011) (authorizing both civil and
religious officials to solemnize civil marriages).
95. Estin, supra note 69, at 457 n.26. Grossman & Yoo, supra note 69, at LA.
96. Estin, supra note 69, at 457 n.26. Grossman & Yoo, supra note 69, at LA.
97. For an insightful discussion of "compulsory heterosexuality," "compulsory matrimo-
ny," and their inter-relationship, see Ruthann Robson's article, Assimilation,
Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation. Robson, supra note 28, at 780 (observing, among
other things, that "[w]hile some same-sex marriage advocates have theorized same-sex
marriage as an antidote to compulsory heterosexuality, the compulsory nature of mat-
rimony itself remains disputed or unacknowledged") (internal citations omitted).
98. See Sarah C. Courtman, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Case Against the Federal Marriage
Amendment, 24 PACE L. REv. 301, 341 (2003) ("In most states, couples wishing to
get married must meet only three simple criteria; they must be of the opposite sex, of
the age of majority, and unrelated to one another within a certain degree of consan-
guinity.").
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Male persons of the age of eighteen years, and female persons
of the age of sixteen years, not nearer of kin than second cous-
ins, and not having a husband or wife living, may be joined in
marriage. A marriage may only be entered into by one mand 99
and one woman.
The adoption of these requirements was presumably driven by convic-
tions that only such persons could appropriately engage in sexual
intercourse. Such requirements clearly manipulate identity because
meeting them is the only means of accessing highly desirable govern-
mental benefits. Civil marriage thereby encourages the adoption of
heterosexual identities.
Americans who marry are also encouraged to adopt specific gender
identities. American marriage statutes have historically limited (and, in
most states, still limit) marriage to opposite-sex couples.'00 They have
also historically required married couples to divide their labor along
gendered lines, with husbands acting as providers and wives, as caretak-
ers."o' While American marriage statutes no longer formally require
married persons to adopt gendered roles, 102 most husbands continue to
function as providers and most wives, as caretakers-particularly when
there are children involved.'o3 Recent Bureau of Labor Statistics reports
reveal that 88% of married fathers but only 43% of married mothers
have full-time employment, 04 and that "[a]mong full-time workers who
are parents of children under 18, married fathers worked about 1.0 hour
more per day than did married mothers."' 5 The same reports reveal that
"[a]mong full-time workers who are parents of children under 18, married
99. OHIO REV. CODE 6 3101.01(A)(West 2004).
100. See Rasmusen, supra note 77.
101. Siegel, supra note 61, at 2129.
102. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (invalidating a gendered alimony statute
because it rested on the archaic ideas that "generally it is the man's primary responsi-
bility to provide a home and its essentials'" and "'the female destined solely for the
home and the rearing of the family' ") (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10,
14-15, 95 (1975)).
103. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, Married Parents, supra note 60, at 1 ("Forty-three
percent of married mothers and 88 percent of married fathers were employed full
time... . Among full-time workers who are parents of children under 18, married
mothers were more likely to provide childcare to house-hold children than were mar-
ried fathers. On an average day, 71 percent of these mothers and 54 percent of these
fathers spent time caring for and helping household children."). See STEVEN L. NoCK,
MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LIVES 62 (1998) (noting that the husband has assumed the role
of "primary provider of the family [and] has committed himself to instrumental tasks
that contribute to his gender identity as a man").
104. BuRE.Au OF LABOR STATISTICS, Married Parents, supra note 60, at 1.
105. Id.
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mothers were more likely to provide childcare to house-hold children than
were married fathers.",o' Entry into marriage, thus, continues to be corre-
lated with the adoption of gendered identities and ideologies."o' Professor
Katharine Baker summarizes marriage's impact on gender by stating that
married persons "are not free to choose their own gender identity.""o
Marriage, she explains, "creates the 'social identities' of husband and
wife," and is ultimately "much more about the absence of choice than the
exercise of it."'09
In sum, civil marriage encourages individuals to adopt religious,
heterosexual, and gendered identities, and this encouragement has be-
come so entrenched in the institution that it cannot realistically be
eradicated in the foreseeable future. Professor Coontz has observed as
much with respect to marriage's impact on gender identity, and her
observation might be extrapolated to apply equally to all three compo-
nents of marital identity. She writes:
For thousands of years marriage was organized in ways that re-
inforced female subservience. Today, even though most of the
legal and economic basis for a husband's authority over his
wife and her deference to his needs is gone, we all have inher-
ited unconscious habits and emotional expectations that
perpetuate female disadvantage in marriage. For example, it is
106. Id. at 2 ("On an average day, 71 percent of these mothers and 54 percent of these
fathers spent time caring for and helping household children. Mothers spent more
time providing this care than did fathers[.]").
107. Even the recent advent of same-sex marriage, which at least has the potential to de-
gender marriage partially, appears to be transforming our perception of same-sex
couples more than it is transforming our perception of the institution as a whole. The
couples who marry mimic opposite-sex marriages.
108. Katharine K. Baker, The Stories ofMarriage, 12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 40 (2010) (cat-
aloging the many ways in which marriage shapes gender identity). Professor Baker has
asserted that "marriage serves as a critical source of identity for both men and wom-
en." Id. at 18. Empirically, she says, marriage "increases the amount of domestic work
that women do and decreases the amount that men do." Id. at 23. Furthermore, she
says, "Marriages with children [are particularly gendered, in that they tend to] de-
crease women's commitment to paid work and increase their commitment to unpaid
work." Id.
109. Id. at 19, 40. Marriage also continues to influence ideology in deeply gendered ways.
As Professor Katherine Franke has asserted, "those who fall within marriage's shadow
find themselves locked into a social field in which the attachments we take up have
meaning already determined by the state." Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving,
76 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2685, 2697 (2008). She explains that, within marriage, the
state rather than the couple determines "the meaning and implications of sexual or
emotional intimacy, cohabitation, monogamy, intermingling of finances, the joint
purchase of property, or the naming of the other party on one's health or life insur-
ance policy[.]" Id. at 2697-98.
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still true that when women marry, they typically do more
housework than they did before marriage. When men marry,
they do less."
In other words, civil marriage's religious, heterosexist, and patriar-
chal aspects have become so entrenched that they necessarily shape our
"habits" and "expectations." Consequently, when Americans marry, they
almost invariably adopt religious, heterosexual, and gendered identities.
As a result, they are almost invariably prevented from engaging in fully
autonomous self-definition.
2. American Civil Marriage Violates Liberty Rights
By preventing fully autonomous self-definition, civil marriage con-
stitutes a "deprivation" of "liberty" within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause. Illustrating this requires proving, first, that monetary
incentives (like monetary penalties) should in some cases constitute
"deprivations;" and, second, that the right to self-define is among our
"liberties." Taken together, these two points illustrate that when civil
marriage deprives individuals of the liberty to self-define, the institution
violates the Due Process Clause.
While "deprivations" have traditionally been limited to criminal
sanctions such as imprisonment or monetary penalties,"' one could ar-
gue that they should be extended to include monetary incentives. This
argument operates by analogy to the free speech context, where the
Court has held that limitations on speech can exist not only in cases of
monetary penalties but also in cases of monetary incentives." 2 In Speiser
v. Randall, for example, the Court explained that a monetary incen-
tive-a tax exemption that was conditioned on its recipient agreeing to
refrain from engaging in certain speech-constituted a limitation on
free speech."' While Speiser rested primarily on procedural due process
110. COONTZ, supra note 5, at 311-12.
111. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (deeming the $200 monetary pen-
alty imposed on Lawrence and Garner for their act of sodomy a deprivation of liberty
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause). Lawrence is discussed further at the
end of this section.
112. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). Speiser is discussed further in
Part II(E). See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545
(1983) ("the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a
constitutional right"), citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
113. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518 (stating that "speech [was being] effectively limited by the
exercise of the taxing power.") (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936).
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grounds,"' the Court emphasized that ordinary procedures were inade-
quate because the right of free speech was so important."' It further
emphasized that the denial of the tax exemption should be treated the
same as the imposition of a criminal fine, since both would have the
same "deterrent effect" on speech."'
It is unclear why this logic should not be extended such that the
denial of a tax exemption for refusing to marry (and, thus, to give up the
liberty to define one's own identity) would be deemed a deprivation of
liberty. Because many of the goals that motivate the protection of free
speech also motivate the protection of other liberties, concepts from the
Court's free speech doctrine should arguably be applicable to other liber-
ty doctrines. All liberty doctrines serve the common goal of enabling
individual self-determination. That free speech doctrine serves this goal
is evident from Justice Brandeis's famous statement in his Whitney v.
California concurrence that free speech is protected because "[t]hose
who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was
to make men free to develop their faculties"' -or, in other words, to
self-determine."" That other liberty doctrines can also serve this goal is
evident from the Court's statement in Lawrence v. Texas that "[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
114. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529. The Court explicitly stated that the appellants argued both
that the law "denied them freedom of speech without the procedural safeguards re-
quired by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" and "invad[ed the]
liberty of speech protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment[.A" Id. at 517, n.3. It proceeded to state that it was deciding the case on the
former ground, without reaching the latter. Id. See also Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (characterizing Speiser as a procedural due process case);
but see Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (discussing
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and referring to the "Speiser-Perry model").
115. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 520, 525.
116. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518 ("To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain
forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the
same as if the State were to fine them for this speech.").
117. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
118. This idea has been developed by Professor Martin Redish, who asserts that free
speech "ultimately serves only one true value": 'individual self-realization.' " Martin
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593 (1982) (explaining
that self-realization encompasses "development of the individual's powers and abili-
ties-an individual 'realizes' his or her full potential-[and] the individual's control
of his or her own destiny through making life-affecting decisions-an individual 're-
alizes' the goals in life that he or she has set"). See also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 994 (1978) (arguing that
the "self-expressive use of speech" is important "independent of any effective com-
munication to others, for self-fulfillment or self-realization"); Jessica Knouse, From
Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 749, 790-91 (2009).
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meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.""' Since all
liberty doctrines serve the common goal of enabling self-determination,
one could argue that they should all recognize monetary incentives im-
peding self-determination as potential deprivations.
Yet the Court has not always been willing to recognize such incen-
tives as deprivations, as evidenced by at least two cases involving the
right to marry. In Califano v. Jobst and Bowen v. Owens, the Court found
no deprivation of liberty where the government had created monetary
disincentives to marriage.120 In both cases, the Court upheld laws under
which certain groups of people (individuals with disabilities in Califano,
and divorced widows in Bowen) had their governmental benefits termi-
nated upon marriage (or remarriage, in Bowen).12' Inasmuch as all liberty
doctrines are meant to promote self-determination, the Court should
recognize that monetary incentives may constitute "deprivations" across
all liberty doctrines.
Assuming that monetary incentives can constitute "deprivations," it
remains to be shown that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clauses actually encompasses the right to define one's own identity. One
of the Court's broadest descriptions of liberty appeared in Lawrence v.
Texas, where it invalidated Texas's criminal ban on same-sex sodomy as
unduly burdening individual liberty.122 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated, "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."123
He further stated that "[b]eliefs about [concepts of existence, meaning,
the universe, and the mystery of human life] could not define the at-
tributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State." 24 While there are many possible readings of Lawrence, 125 these
passages strongly suggest that "liberty" encompasses a broad right to de-
fine one's own identity.
119. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
120. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
121. Califano, 434 U.S. 47; Bowen, 476 U.S. 340.
122. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
124. Lawrence, 529 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
125. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 1399 (2004). Professor Franke makes the insightful observation that Justice
Kennedy's opinion can be read as protecting only those who self-define as members
of long-term relationships and not those who self-define in other ways (e.g., as indi-
viduals engaged in anonymous or non-monogamous sexual conduct). Id. at 1410-11.
Since the Court has not spoken since Lawrence, the scope of the liberty protected re-
mains uncertain.
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If "deprivations" can encompass monetary incentives, and if "liber-
ty" can encompass the right to define one's own identity, then civil
marriage arguably constitutes a deprivation of liberty.126 Thus, when
states provide monetary incentives for civil marriage-which entails the
adoption of religious, heterosexual, and gendered identities-they pre-
vent self-definition and deprive their citizens of liberty. This assertion is
not as radical a departure from existing doctrine as it may initially ap-
pear. In Lawrence, for example, the Court held that a monetary penalty
(the $200 fine imposed for the act of sodomy) that prevented Lawrence
and Garner from defining their own identities constituted a deprivation
of liberty.127 2From a practical perspective, such a monetary penalty is
quite similar to the monetary benefits associated with civil marriage.
Both are in danger of chilling the ability to define one's own identity.
Assuming that civil marriage does deprive individuals of liberty, the
Court would have to determine whether the deprivation was justified.
While the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence is not entirely
settled,'2 8 Lawrence is instructive because it is relatively recent.129 In Law-
rence, when the Court found a deprivation of liberty, it applied rational
basis review (or, perhaps, rational basis "with bite"), and asked whether
Texas's sodomy ban was rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.' 0 It follows that, if civil marriage deprives individuals of liberty,
the Court would be required to ask (at the least) whether the institution
is rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. For the
126. See supra text accompanying footnotes 118 and 125.
127. Lawrence and Garner were each fined $200 for their violation of Texas law. Law-
rence, 529 U.S. at 563.
128. Substantive due process doctrine is unsettled in many senses, including that it is no
longer clear whether the Court still asks if given rights are "fundamental" or applies
the traditional "tiered scrutiny" analysis. See Lawrence, 529 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the Court's approach to fundamental rights has changed,
in the sense that "nowhere does the Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy
is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process Clause"); Calvin Massey, The New
Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 946 (2004)
(surmising that "the neat compartments of tiered scrutiny are beginning to collapse").
129. Lawrence, decided in 2003, is one of the Court's most recent statements on substan-
tive due process. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
130. The Lawrence Court appears to apply rational basis review based on its statement that
"[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest[.]" Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
578. Some have, however, argued that Lawrence actually applies a slightly higher level
of review, referred to as "rational basis with bite." See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The
Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Ap-
plication of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 2769, 2770 (2005) (arguing that the Court should acknowledge
its application of "a more searching form of rational basis review" in cases such as
Lawrence).
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reasons illustrated above, civil marriage cannot survive even rational ba-
sis review.
3. The "Right to Marry" Should Be Abrogated
Some might raise the argument that civil marriage cannot possibly
violate the Due Process Clause because the Supreme Court has recog-
nized a "right to marry" as among the fundamental rights protected by
that clause."' This section, however, argues that the Court should never
have recognized a right to marry and that the existing right could be
eliminated without unsettling prior decisions.
In assessing whether a given right should be protected by the Due
Process Clauses, the Supreme Court has traditionally defined the right
"careful[ly]" and asked whether it is "'deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such
that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.' "132 The
Court has repeatedly found that the right to marry is among the rights
protected by the Due Process Clauses.' However, the right to marry is
doctrinally unnecessary and inappropriate. Removing the right to marry
from the list of rights protected by the Due Process Clauses would en-
hance, rather than diminish, individual liberty.
The Supreme Court first recognized the existence of a right to mar-
ry in dicta in the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska, where the right was
included in a lengthy list of substantive rights that were protected by the
Due Process Clauses during the Lochner Era.' 3 While the right's exist-
131. The Supreme Court has recognized a right to marry in cases. See, e.g., Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (invalidating a regulation preventing prisoners from mar-
rying except under certain narrowly defined circumstances); Bowen v. Owens, 476
U.S. 340 (1986) (upholding a law that terminated government benefits to divorced
widows who remarried, but not to non-divorced widows who remarried); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a law excluding certain persons with child
support obligations from marriage); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (uphold-
ing a law that terminated government benefits to certain disabled persons when they
married persons who were not also receiving government benefits); Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating filing fees for divorce as applied to
indigents); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's anti-
miscegenation ban on substantive due process and equal protection grounds); Meyer
V. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating Nebraska's ban on teaching foreign
languages to children who had not yet completed the eighth grade).
132. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted).
133. See supra note 131.
134. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 ("[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common oc-
cupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
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ence was mere dicta in Meyer,'" it was directly relevant to (though not
independently dispositive of) the outcome of the 1967 case of Loving v.
Virginia, where the Court invalidated Virginia's anti-miscegenation ban
on the dual grounds that it violated the substantive due process right to
marry and the equal protection right to be free from invidious racial
discrimination.16 Since most of the Court's opinion in Loving focused
on equal protection rather than substantive due process, many have
speculated as to why the Court included the substantive due process
analysis.' The Court could, all would concede, have reached the same
outcome by relying solely on the equal protection analysis.'38
While the Court has, in several post-Loving decisions, invoked the
right to marry,' each of those decisions could have been written with-
out reference to the right and founded solely on equal protection
grounds. Professor Martha Nussbaum recently observed that court cases
regarding the right to marry consistently turn on equality principles,
stating "that when the state offer [s] a status that has both civil benefits
and expressive dignity, it must offer it with an even hand.",o On the
basis of this observation, Professor Nussbaum concluded, "There ap-
pears to be no constitutional barrier to a decision of a state to [move] to
a regime of civil unions, or, even more extremely, to a regime of private
contract for marriages[.]""' Professor Patricia Cain similarly observed in
1996, "One cannot even tell under current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence whether marriage is a 'fundamental right' for purposes of
substantive due process (which would suggest it could not be abolished),
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
135. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
136. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
137. See, e.g., Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper Methodolo-
gy When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & NtARY BILL Rrs. J. 685,
706-07 (2008) (asking "why . . . the Court also [held] that the statute deprived the
Lovings of their fundamental right to marry under substantive due process [and sug-
gesting that perhaps the Court] meant to emphasize how odious the law was[.]").
138. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12) ("[In Loving], the
Court's opinion could have rested solely on the ground that the statutes discriminat-
ed on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. But the Court
went on to hold that the laws arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry.").
139. See supra note 131.
140. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FROM DIsGUsT To HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 688 (2010).
141. Id. Professor Nussbaum continues, "[T]he Constitution does not require the state to
use this particular name rather than some other, although it does require the state to
protect people's (equal) liberty in setting up households." Id. at 695.
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or whether it is only a fundamental right whose allocation must adhere
to notions of equal protection."' Professor Cain ultimately concluded
that marriage was the latter type of right, in part because "the Supreme
Court's right to marry cases have all involved situations in which some,
but not all, people experienced a denial of the right." 43
Loving presented such a situation in 1967, as did two important
subsequent cases-Zablocki v. Redhail in 1978, and Turner v. Safley in
1987. In Zablocki, the Court invalidated a Wisconsin law that prohib-
ited persons with child support obligations from marrying unless they
could show that they were in compliance with their obligations and that
their children were not presently (or likely to become) public charges.14 1
While the Court applied heightened scrutiny because the law burdened
the "fundamental" right to marry, Zablocki was an equal protection case
because only certain persons were being denied the right to marry.
The Zablocki Court could arguably have reached the same result with-
out invoking the right to marry by noting that Wisconsin's law facially
discriminated against persons with child support obligations and apply-
ing rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.'47 The law
arguably lacked even a rational relationship to the state's legitimate in-
terest in collecting child support, since it excluded parents who were in
full compliance with their support obligations but whose children re-
mained public charges due to circumstances outside of their control.4
The right to marry was unnecessary to the outcome.
While the Court decided Loving and Zablocki at least partly on
equal protection grounds, it decided Turner solely on substantive due
process grounds. 14  In Turner, the Court invalidated a prison regulation
142. Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 27, 32-33
(1996).
143. Id. at 34.
144. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
145. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (requiring judicial permission upon such showings).
146. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (citations omitted) ("[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause,
'we must first determine what burden of justification the classification created
thereby must meet, by looking at the nature of the classifications and the individual
interests affected.' . . . Since our past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly
interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the
state interests advanced in support of the classification is required.").
147. Rational basis review applies to laws burdening classes, including prisoners, that are
not suspect (suspect classes include race, alienage, and national origin) or quasi-
suspect (quasi-suspect classes include sex and legitimacy). City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
148. Indeed, Mr. Redhail would not have been allowed to marry even if he had met his
child support obligations, as his child would have remained a public charge.
149. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78.
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that barred prisoners from marrying unless they received permission
from their prison superintendent, who would give permission only for
"compelling" reasons such as pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate
child.o While the Turner Court invoked the right to marry, which had
historically triggered heightened scrutiny, it invalidated the regulation
under rational basis review because of the special judicial deference due
to prison regulations.' The Court found that the regulation at issue was
not even "reasonably related" to "penological interests" such as security
and rehabilitation.'5 2 The Turner Court could clearly have reached the
same result without invoking the right to marry by noting that the regu-
lation facially discriminated against prisoners and applying rational basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause.'53 Recognizing a right to mar-
ry was, in Turner, as it had been in Loving and Zablocki, unnecessary.
The Court could have reached the same result not only in Loving,
Zablocki, and Turner, but also in the more minor cases of Boddie v. Con-
necticut, Califano v. Jobst, and Bowen v. Owens without ever recognizing
a constitutional right to marry." Boddie, Ca/ifano, and Bowen, like Lov-
ing, Zablocki, and Turner, all involved marriage regulations impacting
only certain persons, which means that they all could, in theory, have
been decided solely on equal protection grounds.' The right to marry
has been unnecessary to the disposition of the Court's prior cases; in
fact, the only context in which the right could be necessary to the dispo-
sition of a case would be if a state entirely repealed its marriage statutes.
While such a case has not yet been presented, there are at least two
strong arguments that the right to marry likely would not-and should
not-prevent a state from disestablishing civil marriage.
First, the right to marry likely would not prevent a state from
disestablishing civil marriage because the Court has never used the due
process clauses to require the government to provide any positive rights.5 6
150. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82.
151. Turner, 482 U.S at 85, 89-90.
152. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97 ("[T]he Missouri prison regulation, as written, is not reasona-
bly related to these penological interests.").
153. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
154. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977);
Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986).
155. Boddie involved the waiver of a filing fee for divorce that indigents were uniquely
unable to afford. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 383. Califano and Bowen are discussed supra
note 120. Loving, Zablocki, and Turner are discussed supra note 13 1.
156. While I argue in Part I that the Court should recognize at least some positive rights as
implied by the Due Process Clauses (e.g., the rights to food, healthcare, and educa-
tion-but not marriage), my present argument is that the Court has not and will not
likely recognize any positive rights under the existing doctrine. Professor Susan
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Professor Cain made this argument in her 1996 article, explaining that
"after the Supreme Court's [1989] decision in DeShaney, it is unlikely
that the Court will recognize any affirmative obligations under substan-
tive due process."' In DeShaney, the Court held that a severely abused
child had no positive right to governmental protection;' Justice Bren-
nan, dissenting, characterized the majority opinion as emphatically
rejecting the "idea that the Constitution imposes on the States an af-
firmative duty to take basic care of their citizens."'" Since the courts
clearly view the Constitution as "a charter of negative rather than posi-
tive liberties[,]"o60 it seems unlikely that they would invoke the right to
marry to prevent a state from abolishing civil marriage-so long as the
abolition applied equally to all citizens.
Second, the right to marry should not prevent a state from estab-
lishing civil marriage, because the right does not satisfy the Court's test
of being "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.' """ Recognizing the
right to marry actually diminishes individual liberty because it requires
states to privilege those who are willing to self-define as "married,"
which (as previously discussed) entails adopting religious, heterosexual,
and gendered identities. Privileging such identities encourages the adop-
tion of those identities and thus constitutes a deprivation of liberty.
Thus, the right to marry is not properly among the substantive rights
protected by the Due Process Clauses, and recognizing the right is both
doctrinally unnecessary and inappropriate.
C. American Civil Marriage Violates Equal Protection Rights
Civil marriage, as defined above in Part II(A), violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that
"[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.""' This argument proceeds in two parts-Part
Bandes articulated this sentiment, explaining that courts view "the protections of the
Constitution . . . as prohibitory constraints on the power of government, rather than
affirmative duties with which government must comply." Susan Bandes, The Negative
Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271, 2273 (1990).
157. Cain, supra note 142, at 40.
158. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
159. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations ommitted)
("The Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.").
161. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 720, 721 (1997) (citations omitted).
162. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. It should be noted that our constitutional commit-
ment to equality derives not only from the Equal Protection Clause, but also from
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11(C)(i) illustrates that civil marriage creates identity-based hierarchies,
and Part II(B)(ii) illustrates that the creation of such hierarchies violates
the Equal Protection Clause.
1. American Civil Marriage Creates Hierarchy
Civil marriage creates an identity-based hierarchy by privileging
married individuals, who tend to adopt religious, heterosexual, and gen-
dered identities. Civil marriage privileges married individuals by
affording them exclusive access to a broad array of tangible and intangi-
ble benefits arising under both state and federal law.63
The tangible benefits of civil marriage relate to financial matters
such as pensions, taxes, inheritances, and property ownership, as well as
to deeply personal matters such as surrogate decisionmaking.1 Its
intangible benefits relate primarily to social status. Courts and commen-
tators alike have recognized marriage's importance to social status. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has explained that marriage "be-
stows enormous private and social advantages on those who choose to
marry.""' Professor Anita Bernstein has similarly explained, "Like race
and coverture, marital status functions to elevate some individuals and
to subordinate others.""' Professor John Culhane has added that, while
being unmarried "is less likely to be as fully subordinating [as member-
ship in a subordinated racial group,] the effects of governmental
the Citizenship Clause, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they re-
side." Id. Professor Akhil Amar has written that the Citizenship Clause "aimed to ...
mak[e] clear that everyone born under the American flag-black or white, rich or
poor, male or female, Jew or Gentile-was a free and equal citizen." AKHIL AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 381-82 (2005).
163. See Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Associate General Counsel, U.S. General Accounting
Office, to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf (reporting that, "as of December 31,
2003, our research identified a total of 1,138 federal statutory provisions classified to
the United States Code in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving
benefits, rights, and privileges.").
164. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2090-92. See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (2003) (providing a non-comprehensive catalog of many of
the tangible benefits of civil marriage); Abrams, supra note 29, at 31. ("Access to a
spouse's social security pension and the tax-free transfer of property upon a spouse's
death [are examples of] clear benefits of marriage over non-marriage that could be
translated into a dollar figure.").
165. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 (2003) (holding that Massachusetts must offer same-
sex couples the same benefits as opposite-sex couples).
166. Anita Bernstein, Introduction: Questioning Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUES-
TIONING A LEGAL STATUS 12, 12-13 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006).
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signaling are real."16 He has further stated that such signaling may cause
some unmarried individuals to feel "undervalued or even stigmatized.""'
The tangible and intangible benefits of civil marriage privilege married
individuals, thereby establishing insidious identity-based hierarchies.
2. American Civil Marriage Violates Equality Rights
By establishing identity-based hierarchies, civil marriage deprives in-
dividuals of the equality secured by the Equal Protection Clause. Civil
marriage has historically promoted hierarchies based on not only religion,
sexuality, and gender, but also race and marital status. It thereby violates
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause on multiple
grounds. While religion-based hierarchy is more appropriately understood
as an Establishment Clause violation as discussed in Part II(D)(i), this
section discusses the remaining four hierarchies and illustrates how each
violates the Equal Protection Clause. It explores, first, the race-based hier-
archy that privileged whites over non-whites; second, the sex-based
hierarchy that privileges males over females (as well as transsexuals and
intersexuals); third, the sexuality-based hierarchy that privileges straights
over gays (as well as bisexuals who wish to marry persons of the same
sex); and fourth, the marital-status based hierarchy that privileges mar-
ried persons over unmarried persons. While the hierarchies based on
race, sex, and sexuality either have been or are currently in the process of
being removed from our marriage statutes, the hierarchy based on mari-
tal status is implicit in the institution of civil marriage and cannot be
removed by any act short of abolishing the entire institution.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has held
that race-based hierarchies receive more intense scrutiny than sex-based
hierarchies,' and that sex-based hierarchies receive more intense
167. Culhane, supra note 48, at 509. Professor Culhane writes:
The substantial economic advantage that government confers on married
couples is itself a powerful societal signal that the institution is preferred
over other adult relationships, including cohabitation (whether chosen or
forced, as in the case of same-sex couples), single status, more transient
affiliations, and multiple-partner relationships. Even if these govern-
ment-conferred advantages were substantially or completely withdrawn,
though, we would expect married couples to benefit from continued
societal privilege.
Id. at 507.
168. Id. at 508.
169. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (explaining
that laws discriminating based on the suspect classifications of race, alienage, and na-
tional origin receive "strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably
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scrutiny than sexuality-based hierarchies.o Other hierarchies-for ex-
ample, those resting on marital status-receive minimal scrutiny and are
almost always permitted."' By reviewing how civil marriage has histori-
cally promoted (and, in some cases, continues to promote) hierarchies
based on race, sex, sexuality, and marital-status, this section illustrates
two broader points. First, even if all explicit references to race-, sex-, and
sexuality-based hierarchies were removed from our laws, the hierarchies
inherent in the institution of civil marriage would continue to influence
our practices, at least for the foreseeable future. Second, even if civil
marriage could be separated from its history of race, sex, and sexuality
discrimination, it would continue to violate the Equal Protection Clause
by inherently privileging married over unmarried persons.
a. Race-Based Hierarchy
Race-based hierarchy has been deeply entrenched in our marriage
statutes since our nation's founding. 2 The pre-Reconstruction
Constitution did not prevent (and, in many ways, encouraged)'
race-based hierarchy. Prior to Reconstruction, several states maintained
anti-miscegenation laws banning marriage between whites and non-
whites."' After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,
tailored to serve a compelling state interest" while laws discriminating based on the
quasi-suspect classifications of sex and illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny and
will be upheld only if they are "substantially related to a sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest.").
170. Formally, laws discriminating based on any trait other than race, alienage, national
origin, sex, or illegitimacy receive only rational basis review. See Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. at 440. But see Smith, supra note 130, at 2770 (arguing that the Court in
fact applied rational basis "with bite" in both Romer v. Evans, 516 U.S. 620 (1996)
and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.558 (2003)).
171. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440 ("The general rule is that legislation is pre-
sumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
172. Bela August Walker, Fractured Bonds: Policing Whiteness and Womanhood Through
Race-Based Marriage Annulments, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 4 (2008) (reporting that
"[b]ans on interracial sex and marriage began in the colonial era and continued until
1967").
173. PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON 3-36 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining how the original Constitution supported
slavery).
174. Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
371, 372 (1994) (explaining that Virginia's anti-miscegenation law "had its origins in
the seventeenth century[,]" while Alabama's had its origins much later, in the 1850s).
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many states enacted or re-enacted anti-miscegenation laws,"' which
were transparently intended to privilege whites over non-whites and
preserve the purity of the white race. It was not until nearly a century
later in the 1967 case of Loving v. Virginia that the Supreme Court
invalidated an anti-miscegenation law on the basis that it engaged in
invidious racial discrimination and thus violated the Equal Protection
Clause. '7  Because Virginia's anti-miscegenation law facially
discriminated on the basis of race, the Loving Court applied strict
scrutiny and effectively asked whether the law was narrowly tailored to
meet a compelling governmental purpose.17 1 Since the law's purpose of
"maintain[ing] White Supremacy" was clearly not compelling, the law
was invalidated.179
Although our marriage statutes have not constitutionally permitted
race-based hierarchy since 1967, the history of anti-miscegenation laws
has indelibly marked our marital practices. Inter-racial marriage rates
remain low,8 o and as recently as 2009, a Louisiana judge refused to mar-
ry an interracial couple, reportedly on the basis that he did not "believe
in mixing the races."' 8 ' Thus, while marriage may have been formally
redefined after the Court's decision in Loving, it has not been practically
redefined and continues to bear the marks of its discriminatory history.
175. Emily Field Van Tassel, "Only the Law Would Rule Between Us": Antimiscegenation,
the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate over Rights After the Civil War, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 873, 899-900 (1995) ("Before the War, all but four slave states
had laws forbidding marriages between Whites and people of African descent.. . . In
the last third of the nineteenth century, as virtually all Northern states (and some
Midwestern states) that had banned racial intermarriage stripped those laws from the
books, virtually every Southern state enacted or re-enacted laws against intermarriage,
often increasing the severity of the punishment.").
176. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (noting that anti-miscegentation
bans were motivated by desires "'to preserve ... racial integrity'" and maintain
"White Supremacy").
177. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6.
178. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8-9.
179. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
180. Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1463, 1505 (2009) (Data
collected circa 2005 suggests that "[jlust 5% of black married women are married to a
man of another race, compared to 23% of Asian women and 19% of Latinas.").
181. Interracial Couple Denied Marriage License By Louisiana Justice Of The Peace, HUFF-
INGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/15/
interracial-couple-denied-n_322784.html (reporting that a Louisiana judge refused
to marry an inter-racial couple because he did not "believe in mixing the races").
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b. Sex-Based Hierarchy
Sex-based hierarchy, like race-based hierarchy, has been deeply en-
trenched in our marriage statutes since our nation's founding.8 2 This
hierarchy derives largely from English ecclesiastical marriage.8 3 While
English ecclesiastical marriage was not imported wholesale into Ameri-
can law, many significant aspects were adopted."' Early American states
maintained sex-based hierarchy both during marriage and upon divorce.
During marriage, wives were barred from controlling property or enter-
ing contracts and were required to be good homemakers.' Husbands,
in contrast, were allowed to hold property and enter contracts for their
wives, and were required to be good providers."' Upon divorce, wives
were almost always awarded custody of young children under the
"tender years" doctrine,' while husbands were almost always ordered to
pay alimony.' The sex-based hierarchy implicit in the traditional
182. See Sack, supra note 79, at 33.
183. See Samantha Ricci, Rethinking Women and the Constitution: An Historical Argument
for Recognizing Constitutional Flexibility with Regards to Women in the New Republic,
16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 205, 212-16, 224-28 (2009) (describing the status
of married women under English and early American law).
184. Id. at 212-13 (explaining that, while Americans inherited coverture from the English,
early American law was nevertheless flexible enough that women were able to retain
their legal identities in some situations).
185. As Professor Julia Halloran McLaughlin reports, "Early American [marriage and]
divorce law reveals [a] focus on the husband. Property was divided by title, residency
was determined by the husband, wages earned by wives and children belonged to the
husband and father, corporal punishment of wives and children was legally permit-
ted, and married women lacked the capacity to contract, and, thus, to manage their
financial estates." Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth about Best In-
terests, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 113, 135 (2009).
186. Siegel, supra note 61, at 2129 ("As [a] Kentucky court explained ... in 1922, a hus-
band had a duty to perform market labor ('bring home the bacon')[.]"). See abo Ian
W. Freeman, Court Examines the Application of the Necessaries Doctrine and the Pre-
conditions ofa Person's Liability for the Debts ofa Spouse, 48 S.C. L. REv. 53, 53-54
(1996) ("At English common-law, the husband solely was liable for the expenses of
necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical services provided to his wife during co-
habitation. . . . Until recently, American courts . . . retained [this] common-law
doctrine of necessaries in a form virtually unchanged from its English ancestor.").
187. Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L.
423, 425 (1976)("[Wlhen the children were of 'tender years,' the mother, unless
shown to be unfit, should be given preference over the father in the award of cus-
tody.").
188. Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage"- Reconsidering the Duty of Support and
Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 24 (2003)("[H]istorically, as well as currently,
the vast majority of alimony recipients are ex-wives rather than ex-husbands").
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female-homemaker and male-provider roles was thus formally inscribed
in early American marriage law.
It was not until the mid-nineteenth Century that legislatures began
to dismantle the sex-based hierarchies associated with being married
through the adoption of Married Women's Property Acts.'8 ' And it was
not until the mid-twentieth Century that courts began to dismantle the
sex-based hierarchies associated with divorce. Only in the 1970s and
1980s did state courts begin to invalidate the "tender years" doctrine
that had automatically allocated custody of young children to wives,'9o
and only in 1979 did the Supreme Court invalidate a statute that had
allowed judges to award alimony to wives but not husbands.' 9 ' Yet, as
was the case with race-based hierarchy, the removal of sex-based hierar-
chy from our statutes has not dramatically affected our marital practices.
Since married men continue to be the primary providers and married
women continue to be the primary homemakers, 92 divorce courts still
often award women custody of young children and order men to pay
alimony.'"
Furthermore, although many aspects of sex-based hierarchy have
been removed from our marriage statutes, some important ones re-
main-most significantly, the opposite-sex requirement for entry into
marriage. At present, only six states allow both opposite-sex and same-
sex couples to obtain marriage licenses.' Thus, in forty-four states, sex
189. See Sack, supra note 79, at 33 (noting that Married Women's Property Acts "gave
married women the right to own property and incur legal obligations in their own
names, [and thereby] slowly unraveled the system of coverture."). Professor Sack fur-
ther explains that "[t]he first Married Women's Property Act was enacted in
Mississippi in 1839 and, within fifty years, every state had adopted some form of
such an act." Id. at 33, n.6.
190. See, e.g., Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981).
191. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating Alabama's alimony statute, under
which only men could be ordered to pay alimony).
192. Buiumu OF LABOR STATISTICS, Married Parents, supra note 60.
193. Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, in THE FUTURE OF CHIL-
DREN 210, 215 (1994) ("[M]others still overwhelmingly predominate in physical
custody awards."); Perry, supra note 188, at 24 (2003) ("[Hlistorically, as well as cur-
rently, the vast majority of alimony recipients are ex-wives rather than ex-husbands").
194. Only these six states can plausibly argue that their marriage statutes have been suc-
cessfully de-gendered: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, Hew Hampshire,
and New York. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass.
2003); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); S.B. 115, 2009 Leg., 2009-2010 Sess. (Vt.
2009); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 4 57:1-a (2004 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw
%§ 10-13 (McKinney 2011).
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remains relevant to entry into marriage." While opposite-sex require-
ments would seem to entail facial discrimination of the sort that ought
to trigger intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, 96
most courts have not taken this view. 197 They have instead reasoned that
since such requirements bar both men and women from "precisely the
same conduct"-i.e., marrying a person of the same sex-they do not
create sex-based inequality." Commentators have criticized this reasoning
on a variety of grounds. Some have argued that inasmuch as "constitu-
tional rights are individual rights[,] a statute that denies a woman the
right to marry another woman but permits a man to marry [that same]
woman discriminates on the basis of sex."' 99 Such discrimination, the
argument proceeds, cannot be justified because it rests on unfounded
sex stereotypes,2 00 which ultimately reflect the intent to promote and
maintain male supremacy.
195. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d
862; S.B. 115, 2009 Leg., 2009-2010 Sess. (Vt. 2009); N.H. Rev. Stat. §457:1-a
(2004 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §§ 10-13 (McKinney 2011).
196. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that sex-based classifications are
subject to intermediate scrutiny and therefore invalid unless they are "substantially re-
lated" to the achievement of "important governmental objectives").
197. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (rejecting the argument
that the opposite-sex requirement was problematic sex discrimination, while never-
theless holding that same-sex couples were entitled to the same benefits as opposite
sex couples). But see, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57-63 (Haw. 1993) (a
two-judge plurality, comprised of Levinson, J., and Moon, acting C.J., accepted
the sex-discrimination argument). Paul Benjamin Linton reports that "[iln sum,
twelve state reviewing courts, three federal courts, and the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals have all held that statutes reserving marriage to opposite-sex cou-
ples 'do[ ] not subject men to different treatment from women; each is equally
prohibited from the same conduct.'" Paul Benjamin Linton, Same-Sex Marriage and
the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment, 20 GEo. IIASON U. C.R L.J 209, 218
(2010).
198. See, e.g., Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (explaining that "the marriage laws
... do not single out men or women as a class for disparate treatment, but rather
prohibit men and women equally from marrying a person of the same sex" and that
"there is no discrete class subject to differential treatment solely on the basis of sex;
each sex is equally prohibited from precisely the same conduct").
199. Alison Lorenzo, Note, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 1003, 1022 (2008) (emphasis added). See also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1425
(1993) ("Although the state will give a marriage license to virtually any woman-man
couple, no license will be dispensed to any woman-woman couple. As a consequence,
the state is discriminating against the latter couple simply because the second partner
is a woman and not a man. That, the argument goes, is de jute sex discrimination[.]").
200. See Eskridge, supra note 199, at 1425 ("A deeper form of the sex discrimination argu-
ment, developed by Sylvia Law, is that any effort by the state to hardwire sex differences
into the concept of marriage perpetuates traditional sex-based stereotypes of man-as-
breadwinner and woman-as-housekeeper.") (citing Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the
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Since most courts have held that opposite-sex requirements do not
constitute sex discrimination, they have applied only rational basis re-
view and upheld such requirements.20' One common rationale is that
they rationally serve a legitimate interest in privileging individuals who
provide for dependent children under "optimal" conditions.202 This ra-
tionale proceeds from the assumption that opposite-sex parenting
conditions are "optimal., 203 A second and related rationale is that oppo-
site-sex requirements rationally serve a legitimate interest in privileging
individuals who provide for dependent (or inter-dependent) partners. 204
This rationale proceeds from the assumption that opposite-sex relation-
ships are more likely to entail dependency than same-sex relationships.205
A third rationale is that opposite-sex requirements rationally serve a le-
gitimate interest in maintaining the traditional definition of marriage as
"a union between one man and one woman."206
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 232 (1988)). The Supreme Court
has, of course, held that legislation cannot be justified by reference to sex stereotypes.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (articulating the general
proposition that legislation should not rest on "gender-based generalization[s]").
201. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 364-65 (2006).
202. Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 359 (stating that the legislature could rationally have viewed
opposite-sex parenting as preferable).
203. See, e.g., Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 359 (upholding New York's ban on same-sex mar-
riage). The Hernandez majority identified two child-related reasons for upholding the
exclusion of same-sex couples under rational basis review: "First, the Legislature could
rationally decide that, for the welfare of children, it is more important to promote
stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships. Het-
erosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of children;
homosexual intercourse does not.... [Slecond[,] [t]he Legislature could rationally
believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a
mother and a father." Id. at 359.
204. Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 336 (noting, but ultimately dismissing as unsubstantiated,
the state's argument that "same-sex couples are less financially dependent on each
other than opposite-sex couples").
205. Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 336.
206. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476 (Conn. 2008)
(noting, but ultimately rejecting, the state's arguments that opposite-sex require-
ments are needed to, inter alia, "preserve the traditional definition of marriage as a
union between one man and one woman."); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d
675, 718-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("We cannot say the state's interest in continu-
ing this institution in the form it has always taken, and continues to take across the
country, is so unreasonable that the marriage laws must be stricken under rational ba-
sis review."), reversed by In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal.4th 757 (Cal. 2008). Note that
there are other rationales for upholding opposite-sex requirements under rational ba-
sis review-e.g., promoting uniformity with other states that ban same-sex marriage.
See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 476 (noting, but rejecting, the state's argument that oppo-
site-sex requirements are needed "to promote uniformity and consistency with the
laws of other jurisdictions").
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Each of these three arguments is subject to critique. The first two,
taken together, suggest that marriage is intended to privilege providers-
those who support dependent children (under the first rationale) or
partners (under the second rationale). While privileging providers is
certainly a legitimate interest, opposite-sex requirements are not
rationally related to its achievement. Individuals in opposite-sex
relationships are not inherently more likely than others to assume
provider roles.207 Therefore, privileging providers cannot provide the
rational basis necessary to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. The
third rationale-maintaining the traditional definition of marriage-
similarly fails, because maintaining tradition cannot in itself be a
legitimate interest. As one (dissenting) judge explained, "That civil
marriage has traditionally excluded same-sex couples-i.e., that the
'historic and cultural understanding of marriage' has been between a
man and a woman-cannot in itself provide a rational basis for the
challenged exclusion." 2 08 This third rationale, indeed, reveals the
difficulty of redefining the term "marriage." 209 While opposite-sex
requirements may not be constitutionally justified, they continue to
dominate our statutes and define our institution.
Although opposite-sex requirements are the most obvious way in
which our current marriage statutes maintain sex-based hierarchy, they
are by no means the only way. Most states make it substantially easier
for women than men to change their surnames upon both marriage and
divorce.210 Most women take advantage of this relative ease, changing
207. See U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, Household Characteristics of Opposite-Sex and Same-Sex
Couple Households: 2008 (2009), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/
files/ssex-tables-2008.xls (reporting that 43% of opposite-sex couples and 20% of
same-sex couples have children in their households). While opposite-sex couples are
currently more likely than same-sex couples to have children in their households, the-
se statistics must be understood in light of the current legal climate, which often
prevents same-sex couples from enjoying the same parental rights as opposite-sex
couples. Furthermore, child-rearing is only one way in which an individual can func-
tion as a provider. Individuals may also provide for their partners, or for other adults,
such as relatives or longtime friends. There is little evidence to suggest that same-sex
partners are less likely to be inter-dependent, or less likely to be caring for other
adults, than opposite-sex partners. See Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 336-37 (dismissing
the state's contention that same-sex couples are less likely to be dependent on each
other as a "conclusory generalization" and noting that many same-sex couples have
children or other family members (e.g., "aged parents") who are dependent on them).
208. Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 395 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
209. The difficulty of redefining "marriage" was discussed above, in Part I(A).
210. See Kelly Snyder, All Names are Not Equal: Choice of Marital Surname and Equal
Protection, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 561, 583 (2009) (reporting that "in most states,
it is easier for women to change their last names [upon marriage] than for men to do
so.") (citing Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the
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their names when they marry211 and thus symbolically (even if not inten-
tionally) importing the history of male domination into their own
marriages. Our current marriage statutes also maintain sex-based hierar-
chy through the use of sex-based terminology in that they typically refer
to men as "grooms" or "husbands" and to women as "brides" or
"wives."2 12 While our statutes no longer formally assign husbands and
wives different rights and obligations, their continued use of sex-based
terminology suggests that the practical roles of husbands and wives re-
main somehow saliently different. Our marriage statutes, in sum,
continue to maintain sex hierarchy through a wide variety of mecha-
nisms.
However, in light of the above discussion of the race-based re-
quirements, we can predict that even if all of the existing sex-based
requirements were successfully removed from our statutes, they would
likely continue to influence our practices. We have already seen that,
despite the removal of legal requirements that husbands act as providers
and wives act as caregivers, husbands and wives continue to adopt those
sex-based roles.213 Similarly, even if future legislation were to equalize the
ease of surname changes and de-gender the statutory terminology, it is
likely that women would continue to change-and men, to retain-
their surnames upon marriage, that couples would continue to select
traditional wedding ceremonies that involved distinct roles for "brides"
and "grooms," and that married women and men would continue to
self-identify as "wives" and "husbands," respectively. While the removal
of sex-based requirements from our marriage statutes would be progres-
sive, it would not likely be transformative.
Future ofMaritalNames, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 809-23 (2007)) (reviewing the law
of name changes).
211. Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in Family
Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893, 895 (2010) ("noting that women almost universally adopt
their husbands' last names upon marriage, despite the formal freedom of women to
retain their names and of men to adopt their wives' last names . . . . Recent data sug-
gest this practice may even be on the rise among the college-educated women who
have been most likely to retain their names."). See also Emens, supra note 210, at 785
("Overall, only 10 percent of married women in the U.S. have as their last name their
own birthname or any name other than their husband's birthname.").
212. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-304 (2011) "[T]he parties must declare, in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage that they take each other as husband
and wife."); Aluz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-130 (2010) (referring to parties as "groom"
and "bride").
213. BuRAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, Married Parents, supra note 60.
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c. Sexuality-Based Hierarchy
Like race- and sex-based hierarchies, sexuality-based hierarchy has
been deeply entrenched in our marriage statutes since the our nation's
founding.2 14 Sexuality-based hierarchies arise implicitly from opposite-
sex requirements to prevent gays, lesbians, and certain bisexuals
effectively from marrying. While many have argued that sexual orien-
tation ought to be considered a suspect classification that triggers
heightened scrutiny,215 most courts have rejected this argument and
applied only rational basis review. 216 Accordingly, such courts have up-
held the exclusion of gays, lesbians, and certain bisexuals from civil
marriage-generally, based on one or more of the three rationales dis-
cussed above as justifications for sex discrimination."' Such courts have,
in other words, held that excluding gays, lesbians, and certain bisexuals
from marriage is "rationally related" to "legitimate" interests in privileg-
ing those who provide for dependent children or partners, and
maintaining the traditional definition of marriage as a union between
one man and one woman.
While the removal of sexuality-based discrimination from our mar-
riage statutes seems inevitable within the next generation,2 18 it will not
214. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 33 (1996) (noting that our nation has "long
condemned homosexual behavior and [has] never allowed same-sex marriage").
215. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Celebrating the Differences that Could Make a Difference:
United States v. Virginia and a New Vision ofSexual Equality, 70 OmIo ST. L.J. 943,
965 n.99 (2009) (citing instances in which "marriage equality advocates have argued
that heightened scrutiny should apply to [marriage] restrictions because gays and les-
bians constitute a suspect class and because sexual orientation constitutes a suspect
classification").
216. Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, EqualAccess and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1375, 1379, 1409 (2010) (reporting that "state courts in New York, Wash-
ington, Maryland, Indiana, and Arizona have all held that classifications on the basis
of sexual orientation do not pose special concerns" but that "[h]igh courts in Califor-
nia, Connecticut, and Iowa all held that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation received heightened scrutiny ("strict" scrutiny in California and an inter-
mediate level in Iowa and Connecticut)").
217. See supra text accompanying notes 203, 204, and 206.
218. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REv. 431,
484-85 (2005) (reporting that "The demographics of public opinion on issues of
sexual orientation virtually ensure that one day in the not-too-distant future a
substantial majority of Americans will support same-sex marriage: young people are
much more likely to support gay rights than are their elders. Indeed, a poll taken in
June 2003 showed that sixty-one percent of respondents aged eighteen to twenty-
nine already supported the legalization of same-sex marriage, while among those aged
65 and over just twenty-two percent did so.") (internal citations omitted).
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necessarily eliminate the gendered or heterosexist aspects of our marital
practices for reasons similar to those already discussed with respect to
the removal of race- and sex-based discrimination. Many have argued
that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals will not transform marriage, but rather
will be transformed-and, ultimately, assimilated-by its patriarchal
and heterosexist norms.219 Some evidence of this lies in the fact that,
among the same-sex couples who obtained civil unions in Vermont dur-
ing the first year they were available, women were much more likely
than men to change their surnames.220 Thus, while the removal of sexu-
ality-based requirements will be progressive, it will (like the removal of
race- and sex-based requirements) most likely not be transformative.
In conclusion, marriage statutes have been used throughout our na-
tion's history to create and maintain a variety of clearly illegitimate
hierarchies. While we have removed some of these hierarchies through
legislative reforms or judicial decisions, many remain. Even if we could
successfully remove all of the remaining hierarchies from our statutes,
we could not remove the indelible marks they have left on our practices.
The term "marriage" cannot be successfully redefined to exclude its rac-
ist, patriarchal, and heterosexist history. As evidenced by the debates
over whether same-sex couples ought to be entitled to enter "marriages"
or relegated to a separate regime of "civil unions," the term "marriage"
has an "evocative and important meaning 22' that cannot be separated
from its history.
d. Marital-Status-Based Hierarchy
Even if our marriage statutes could be separated from their discrimi-
natory history, they would still continue to violate the Equal Protection
Clause because of their inherent privileging of married over unmarried
individuals. Despite the fact that courts have deemed marital status a non-
219. See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 118-24 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) (arguing that same-
sex marriage will assimilate gays and lesbians into the mainstream).
220. Kim, supra note 211, at 940 ("In data that she collected regarding naming practices
in Vermont civil unions during the first year that such relationship status was offered,
Emens found that of the six percent of couples who shared some part or all of their
last names, women disproportionately shared their names compared to men.") (citing
Emens, supra note 210, at 789).
221. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006) (holding that same-sex couples are
entitled to the same rights and benefits as other couples- but not to the title of "mar-
riage").
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suspect classification and applied only rational basis review, privileging
long-term sexual partnerships is so arbitrary that it could not survive even
that lowest level of review.
D. American Civil Marriage Violates First Amendment Rights
Civil marriage violates at least two of the rights secured by the First
Amendment and incorporated against state governments via the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Part lI(D)(i) illustrates that civil
marriage violates the Establishment Clause; Part II(D)(ii) illustrates that
civil marriage also violates the Free Speech Clause.
1. American Civil Marriage Establishes Religion
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which was in-
corporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause in 1940,223 provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion[.], 224 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Establishment Clause to prevent the privileging of one
religion over others as well as the privileging of religion over non-
religion.225 While the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
226
not been entirely consistent, statutes that are neutral and generally
222. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 2001)
(applying rational basis review to a policy treating married and unmarried individuals
differently).
223. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
224. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
225. McCreary Cnry. Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing, inter alia,
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) and Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)) ("The touchstone for our analysis is the principle
that the "First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.").
226. Commentators have described the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence as
a "'doctrinal quagmire,' 'schizophrenia,' 'inconsistent and unprincipled,' 'a conceptu-
al disaster area,' 'a mess,' [and an] 'incantation of verbal formulae devoid of
explanatory value[.]"' Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal,
23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 309, 311 (1994) (citing Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1987); William
J. Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall ofSepa-
ration or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY's L.J. 1, 8 (1984); Phillip E. Johnson,
Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REv.
817, 839 (1984); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Re-
ligion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233, 264, 267 (1989); John H. Mansfield, The
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applicable regarding religion have often been subject to some version of
the test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 12 To survive the "Lemon test,
a statute must satisfy three requirements: "First, [it] must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.' 228
This section argues that American marriage statutes violate the Es-
tablishment Clause by privileging some religions (i.e., Christian religions)
over others, as well as by privileging religion over non-religion.229 It begins
by analyzing American marriage statutes under the Lemon test and argu-
ing that they fail to satisfy any of the requirements. It proceeds by
conceding that while most courts would disagree with this analysis and
find American marriage statutes compliant with the Lemon test, such stat-
utes violate a more proper and robust interpretation of the Establishment
Clause.
American marriage statutes fail the first requirement of Lemon test
because they lack a "secular purpose." The Court elaborated on what it
means to have a secular purpose in the 2005 decision of McCreary County
v. ACLU.20 There, the Court upheld an injunction that had prevented
two Kentucky counties from displaying the Ten Commandments in their
courthouses because their purpose was "predominantly religious [.]"231 The
justices explained that, to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, a
state's purpose must be "predominant [1y]" secular,232 and not "merely sec-
ondary to a religious objective." 233 They further explained that "[t]he eyes
that look to purpose belong to an 'objective observer,"' who is aware of
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 847, 848 (1984)).
227. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
228. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. For a concise and up-to-date discussion of the meaning
of each of the three requirements, see David M. Estes, justice Sotomayor and Estab-
lishment Clause Jurisprudence: Which Antiestablishment Standard Will Justice Sotomayor
Endorse?, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 525, 527-30 (2010).
229. Others have made similar arguments. See, e.g., Amelia A. Miller, Letting Go of a Na-
tional Religion: Why the State Should Relinquish All Control over Marriage, 38 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 2185, 2210-14 (2005) (discussing potential Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to the institution of marriage).
230. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864.
231. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 881 ("Given the ample support for the District Court's find-
ing of a predominantly religious purpose behind the Counties' third display, we
affirm the Sixth Circuit in upholding the preliminary injunction.").
232. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 ("When the government acts with the ostensible and
predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates the central Establishment
Clause value of official religious neutrality[.]").
233. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864.
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the entire "historical context."2 34 Because the McCreary County Court
found that an objective observer, who was aware of the entire historical
development of the Ten Commandments displays, 235 would have per-
ceived them as motivated by a predominantly religious purpose, it held
that the displays lacked the requisite secular purpose.23 6
Similarly, an objective observer, aware of the historical development
of American marriage statutes discussed in Part I(A), would perceive those
statutes as motivated by a predominantly religious purpose. Even though
American marriage may have been intended to serve some legitimate secu-
lar purposes, such as promoting stability, child-rearing, and partnership,
those purposes were arguably secondary to its predominant purpose of
codifying religious precepts. Some evidence that American marriage was
motivated by this purpose lies in the fact that the requirements for entry
into and exit from the institution were largely imported from English
ecclesiastical marriage.237 As Professor Jane C. Murphy observes, while
laws regarding the licensing, solemnization, and dissolution of mar-
riage "have always been the subject of secular state control in this
country, [they] are directly traceable to the ecclesiastical courts and
canon law of medieval Europe and England."23 8 These deep roots in
religion suggest that American marriage statutes were originally motivat-
ed by a predominantly religious purpose.
Some might argue that although American marriage statutes were
originally motivated by a predominantly religious purpose, they have over
234. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862.
235. The displays began as overtly religious, and were then somewhat diluted in an ulti-
mately unsuccessful effort to comply with the Establishment Clause.
236. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 881. The Court also found a religious purpose and invalidated
state practices in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that the gov-
ernment could not require public schools teaching evolution to also teach "creation
science"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that the government could
not require the Ten Commandments to be posted in public school classrooms); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1975) (holding that the government could not authorize
public school teachers to hold a one-minute silence for meditation/prayer). The
Court, however, found secular purposes and upheld laws in cases such as McGowan
v. Maryland, 336 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding that the government could require busi-
nesses to close on Sundays because having a uniform day of rest was a valid secular
purpose).
237. See supra Part II(A).
238. Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Lan-
guage of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1111, 1136, 1162 (1999)
(citing S. v. S., 29 A.2d 325, 326 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942) ("Though the Ecclesiastical
Law of England is no part of our Common Law . . . that part of the jurisdiction of
the Ecclesiastical Courts relating to annulment of marriage and divorce was given by
law to our Courts, [such that] we should follow the principles and precedents of the
Ecclesiastical Courts in the administration of our law[.]").
2012] CIVIL MARRIAGE 409
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
time come to serve the predominantly secular purpose of promoting rela-
tionships characterized by stability, care-taking, and partnership. In the
1961 case of McGowan v. Maryland,2 39 the Supreme Court indicated that
laws that were originally motivated by predominandy religious purposes
could become constitutional if they came to serve predominantly secular
purposes over time.4 While the McGowan Court acknowledged that
"Sunday Closing Laws" were originally motivated by the predominantly
religious purpose of promoting observation of the Sabbath,241 it held that
the laws were nevertheless constitutional at the time of litigation because
they had come to serve the predominantly secular purpose of providing a
"uniform day of rest for all citizens[.]" 24 2 The Court found the evolving
motivations of Sunday Closing Laws vitiated the initial Establishment
Clause violation.243
Marriage is not analogous. American marriage statutes continue to
serve predominantly religious purposes. In the 1965 decision of Griswold
v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court described marriage as "a coming to-
gether for better or for worse [that is] intimate to the degree of being
sacred."244 The phrase "for better or for worse" echoes the Anglican mar-
riage vows from the Book of Common Prayer,245 and the concept of
marriage as "sacred" clearly derives from religion-for Catholics, marriage
241is a sacrament. Similarly, in the 1978 decision of Turner v. Safley, the
Court reaffirmed the existence of the "right to marry" at least in part
based on a recognition that "many religions recognize marriage as having
spiritual significance."247 In recent same-sex marriage cases, state courts
239. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
240. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442-43. The Court further explained that "the 'Establishment'
Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely
happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions."
241. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 446.
242. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445. The Court continued by explaining that "the fact that
this day [of rest] is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the dominant Chris-
tian sects, does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals."
243. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 444 ("In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws
through the centuries, and of their more or less recent emphasis upon secular consid-
erations, it is not difficult to discern that as presently written and administered, most
of them, at least, are of a secular rather than of a religious character, and that present-
ly they bear no relationship to establishment of religion as those words are used in the
Constituion of the United States.").
244. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
245. The BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER requires each spouse to promise to remain married
"for better for worse [sic]." BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, supra note 65.
246. Fredric J. Bold, Jr., Vows to Collide: The Burgeoning Conflict Between Religious Institu-
tions and Same-Sex Marriage Antidiscrimination Laws, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 188
(2009) (discussing the role of marriage within the Catholic Church).
247. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
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have approvingly quoted both of the above passages to illustrate marriage's
248
continuing importance to our society. Professor Murphy writes that,
while marriage statutes may "have many secular goals-record keeping,
public health, prevention of fraud-they [are also] grounded in moral
concerns[.]" 249 Because our marriage statutes are motivated by a predomi-
nantly religious purpose, they fail to satisfy the first requirement of the
Lemon test.
American marriage statutes fail the second requirement of the Lemon
test because their primary effect is to advance religion. The comparison of
two cases that triggered substantial discussion of the second require-
ment--one that resulted in invalidating the law at issue, and another that
resulted in upholding it-will be instructive. First, in the 1985 case of
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,250 the Supreme Court invalidated a law that
gave every employee the "right not to work" on his or her Sabbath, based
on a finding that the law's primary effect was to advance religion.2 51 Se-
211
cond, in the 1987 case of Church of Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
the Supreme Court upheld a law exempting religious organizations from
certain anti-discrimination provisions, based in part on a finding that the
law's primary effect was not to advance religion. 253 The Amos Court ex-
plained, "A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches
to advance religion [.1 For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it
must be fair to say that the government itselfhas advanced religion through
its own activities and influence. 5 4
Based on a comparison with the applications of Lemon's second re-
quirement in Estate of Thornton and Amos, one can reasonably argue that
248. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 416 (Conn. 2008).
249. Murphy, supra note 238, at 1162. Professor Steven Nock has also recognized the
close relationship between civil and religious marriage, and has observed that the
norms associated with civil marriage clearly derive from the norms associated with re-
ligious marriage. Steven L. Nock, Why Not Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 273,
289-90 (2001). It should also be noted that identities within civil marriage derive
from identities within religious marriage. As Kathleen McDonald writes, "Historical-
ly, religions codified explicit rules giving husbands the authority to beat ('chastise')
their wives." Kathleen A. McDonald, Battered Wives, Religion, and Law: An Interdis-
ciplinary Approach, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 251, 252 (1990).
250. Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
251. Estate of Thorton, 472 U.S. at 710-11 (O'Connor, J. & Marshall, J., concurring).
252. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987).
253. Church of Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 327.
254. Church of Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original). The
Court continued, "As the Court observed in Walz, 'for the men who wrote the Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity.' " (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
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marriage's primary effect is to advance religion. By establishing a govern-
mental institution called "marriage," and then defining that institution
almost entirely by reference to religious understandings of marriage,255 the
government is not simply allowing churches to advance their religions.
Rather, the government itself is advancing religion by directly converting
religious precepts into legal provisions and modeling a civil institution
after a religious one. As Professor Perry Dane explains, "[M]arriage as an
institution challenges the secular/religious dichotomy[.]" 256 'American
civil marriage," he writes, "is a secular legal institution that has a central,
and distinctive, layer of religious meaning. 257 Inasmuch as American mar-
riage statutes effectively incorporate religious understandings of marriage,
they fail to satisfy the second requirement of the Lemon test.
American marriage statutes fail the third requirement of the Lemon
test because they foster excessive governmental entanglement with reli-
gion. As the Lemon Court explained, a statute "entangles" the government
with religion when its administration requires a "comprehensive, discrim-
inating, and continuing state surveillance. 258 The law at issue in Lemon,
which subsidized the teaching of secular subjects in religious schools, 259
essentially required constant state surveillance of religious school teachers
to ensure that they did not invoke their religious beliefs while being com-
pensated by government funds.260 Accordingly, the law was invalidated. 261'
Like the law at issue in Lemon, American marriage statutes foster
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. American marriage
statutes entangle the government with religion in the sense that their
administration requires "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance. 26 2 The primary reason that American marriage stat-
utes require state surveillance is that they authorize religious officials to
satisfy statutory solemnization requirements.26 New York law, for exam-
255. See supra Part II(A).
256. Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1156 (2009) (ultimately
concluding "that the 'secular' and 'religious' meanings and institutions of marriage
are so intermeshed in our history, legal and religious imagination, and doctrine that
trying to wall off 'civil marriage' from religious considerations is neither possible nor
desirable").
257. Id. at 1156.
258. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
259. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
260. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 ("A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and
the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be in-
spected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs
and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment.").
261. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
262. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 (setting forth the requirement of state surveillance).
263. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 11 (McKinney 2011).
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pie, provides that "No marriage shall be valid unless solemnized by either
[a] clergyman or minister of any religion [or a government official.] "26 A
secondary reason that some American marriage statutes require state sur-
veillance is that they authorize religious officials to satisfy premarital
counseling requirements.265 Utah law, for example, provides that any
"[premarital counseling required ... shall be considered fulfilled if the
applicants present a certificate verified by a clergyman that the applicants
have completed a course of premarital counseling approved by a church
and given by or under the supervision of the clergyman."26 6 Inasmuch as
regulating entry into civil marriage requires state surveillance of religious
officials, American marriage statutes foster excessive governmental entan-
glement with religion and fail to satisfy the third requirement of the
Lemon test.
Despite the above analysis of each of Lemon's three requirements,
most courts would likely hold that American marriage statutes do not
fail the Lemon test and, accordingly, do not violate the Establishment
Clause.267 The 1992 case of Dean v. District of Columbia, in which a
same-sex couple argued that their exclusion from marriage was motivat-
ed by a "'sectarian biblical interpretation,'" provides an example of how
most courts would likely apply the Lemon test.269 While the Dean court
was considering the legality of an exclusion from the institution rather
than the legality of the institution itself, Dean is the most on-point ex-
ample available since no court has yet engaged in a serious analysis of
whether the institution of marriage itself violates the Establishment
Clause.
The Dean court found each of the three requirements of the Lemon
test satisfied and ultimately upheld the exclusion of same-sex couples
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-33(4) (West 2001).
266. Id.
267. On a related note, Ben Schuman has argued that Establishment Clause challenges to
opposite-sex requirements for entry into marriage would likely fail. Ben Schuman,
Gods and Gays: Analyzing the Same-Sex Marriage Debate fom a Religious Perspective,
96 GEO. L.J. 2103, 2106, 2129-34 (2008).
268. Dean v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Su-
per. Ct. June 2, 1992), affd, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). On appeal, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals noted, "Appellants have not renewed ... their argument
that the trial court's (and possibly the Council's) reliance on the Bible to understand
the meaning of "marriage" violated appellants' First Amendment rights." Dean v.
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 310 n.1 (D.C. 1995). Same-sex marriage has
since been legalized in the District of Columbia, via the Religious Freedom and Mar-
riage Equality Act of 2009. Jackson v. District of Columbia, 692 F. Supp. 2d 5, 6
(D.D.C. 2010).
269. Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *1.
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from marriage.270 It found Lemon's first requirement satisfied by holding
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage served several secu-
lar purposes. Confusingly, these purposes included "protect[ing] the
sacred institution of marriage" by ensuring that it was reserved for cou-
ples who could appropriately engage in sexual intercourse. It found
Lemon's second requirement satisfied by holding that, even if the exclu-
sion of same-sex couples had been "motivated by religious
convictions," 272 the exclusion did not actually "advance" religion since it
excluded same-sex couples regardless of whether they were "atheists, ag-
nostics or believers" and did not "coerce [anyone] in the slightest to alter
his or her convictions."273 It found Lemon's third requirement satisfied
without providing any analysis. 274 Based on these three findings, the
Dean court ultimately dismissed the Establishment Clause claim as "to-
tally frivolous [.]"271
While the Establishment Clause issues raised by the institution of
civil marriage are not identical to those raised by the exclusion of same-
sex couples from the institution, Dean nevertheless illustrates how courts
might reason that marriage satisfies at least the first two requirements of
the Lemon test. With respect to the first requirement, it illustrates that
marriage can be viewed as serving the "secular purpose" of maintaining a
social institution that merely happens to overlap with a religious institu-
tion. With respect to the second requirement, it illustrates that marriage
can be viewed as not affirmatively "advancing" religion since religiosity
is not a formal requirement for entry into marriage. Perhaps most im-
portantly, however, Dean illustrates the Lemon test's inability to
effectuate a robust interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
270. Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *8 ("[T]he prohibition against same-sex marriages ad-
vances no religion and has secular purposes. Moreover, it fosters no excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. Hence, said prohibition, even if based up-
on the legislators' religious and moral beliefs, does not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause.").
271. Dean, 1992 WVL 685364, at *8 ("[T]he secular purposes in prohibiting homosexual,
same-sex marriages are . . . (a) to foster . .. socially-acceptable procreation; (b) to
avoid taking any action which would denote societal approval, condonation or en-
couragement of the sexual practice (i.e. sodomy) so intimately associated with
homosexuality as to "define the class" (Bowers, Poe and Padula) and (c) to protect the
sacred institution of marriage from such a radical transformation and re-definition
that its very "consummation" by the marital partners would be biologically impossi-
ble and the anticipated sexual intimacies of said partners immoral and, under the
current state of the law, illegal.").
272. Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *5.
273. Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *7.
274. Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *8 ("[The exclusion of same-sex couples] fosters no ex-
cessive governmental entanglement with religion.").
275. Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *I.
414 [Vol. 18:361
While some have argued that the Lemon test is satisfactory, it fails
to honor the "wall of separation between church and state" that Thomas
Jefferson envisioned in his 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists.276 The
Supreme Court acknowledged as much in Lemon, when it stated that
"the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct,
and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship." 277 Although the Court has, on occasion, claimed to en-
,,278dorse the "wall of separation, a true embrace of this interpretation
would require the renunciation of civil marriage-an institution so in-
tertwined with religious marriage that there can be no meaningful
separation.
2. American Civil Marriage Violates Free Speech
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, which was incor-
porated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in 1925,279 provides that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridg-
ing the freedom of speech[j" 2"o The Supreme Court has held that laws
sometimes "abridge" the freedom of speech without directly mandating
or prohibiting any speech-as, for example, in the case of laws that con-
dition government benefits on individuals engaging in or refraining
from certain speech.28' Speiser v. Randall, discussed above in Part
212II(A)(ii), influenced the Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
276. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), available at
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html ("Believing with you that religion is a
matter which lies solely between Man & his God, . . . I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.").
277. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
278. Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citation omitted).
279. Gilow v. New York, 286 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
280. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
281. Bd. of Cnry. Comm'rs of Wabaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674
(1996) ("[C]onstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,'
effect of governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights,' our modern 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine
holds that the government 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that in-
fringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech' even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit[]") (internal citations omitted).
282. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). While Speiser rested primarily on procedural
due process grounds, see supra note 114, the Court in Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation referenced Speiser's contribution to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine and referring to the "Speiser-Perry model").
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In Speiser, the Court considered a law that conditioned a governmental
benefit in the form of a tax exemption for veterans on veterans subscrib-
ing an oath that stated, among other things, that they would not
advocate overthrow of the United States government by unlawful
means.2 83 The fact that the law conditioned a governmental benefit on
engagement in certain speech influenced the Court's decision to deem
the law unconstitutional. 8 1
American marriage statutes unconstitutionally condition govern-
mental benefits, including tax benefits,2 85 on expression of the ideologies
implicit in marriage. Illustrating that American marriage statutes impose
unconstitutional conditions requires proving, first, that American mar-
riage statutes condition governmental benefits on entry into the
institution of marriage and, second, that entry into marriage is inherent-
ly expressive.
Courts and commentators have long recognized marriage as expres-
sive. The Supreme Court has described marriage as an "[expression] of
emotional support and public commitment."28 Professor Nussbaum
explains, "When people get married, they typically make a statement of
love and commitment."28 7 Professor David Cruz describes marriage as "a
unique symbolic or expressive resource, usable to communicate a variety
of messages to one's spouse and others."288 The messages, which he says
may include expressions of "love, fidelity, . . . commitment[,]" and "ma-
turity,"2 89 are manifest not only in wedding ceremonies, but also in the
enduring status of being married.290 Because marriage has such a thick
283. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529.
284. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529 ("[A]ppellants could not be required to execute the declara-
tion as a condition for obtaining a tax exemption[.]").
285. Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex Marriage from the
Perspective of a Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 436-40 (1999) (catalog-
ing and explaining the tax benefits that are uniquely accessible to married couples).
286. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
287. Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 669 ("The statement made by the marrying couple is
usually seen as involving an answering statement on the part of society: we declare
our love and commitment, and society, in response, recognizes and dignifies that
commitment.").
288. David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call it Marriage"- The First Amendment and Marriage as
an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 298 (2001) (arguing that opposite-sex
requirements for entry into marriage burden the right to freedom of speech that is
protected by the First Amendment).
289. Id. at 929, 942. One of the ways in which marriage may express maturity is that it
"communicates to the world (however accurately or not) that one's sex life is simply
one facet of one's life, incorporated into a presumptively balanced whole." Id at 942.
290. Id. at 935-36 ("[C]ivil marriage, and not just marriage ceremonies or religious mar-
riage, should be understood as expressive. Access to the status relationship that is civil
marriage provides couples with an important and unique expressive resource, some-
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and intractable definition, getting married and being married are inher-
ently expressive. Marriage may, in addition to the messages that
Professor Cruz mentioned, convey messages associated with religiosity,
heterosexism, and patriarchy. Moreover, because American marriage
statutes condition access to government benefits on getting married and
being married, they violate our freedom of speech.
One need not, however, rely solely on the argument that marriage
imposes unconstitutional conditions. One might make the more direct
argument that, under Professor Robson's view of marriage as "compulso-
ry,""' governments that establish marriage directly mandate speech.
Professor Robson asserts that by coercing individuals to marry, the gov-
ernment is effectively coercing them to engage in the expressive activity
. . .292
associated with marriage.
III. AMERICAN CIVIL MARRIAGE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
Having illustrated that American civil marriage is incompatible
with American democracy, Part III assesses the potential remedies. It
begins by asking whether civil marriage could be redefined to comport
with democratic principles, and concludes that such fundamental re-
definition is impossible. It proceeds by asking whether civil marriage
could be replaced by another relationship-centered institution that bet-
ter comports with democratic principles, and concludes that the civil
union regimes some have proposed are preferable but ultimately un-
democratic. It ends by arguing that civil marriage should be abolished
and that state governments should shift their focus from privileging sex-
ual partners to privileging individual providers. Part III(A) explains why
redefinition and replacement of civil marriage are inadequate solutions;
Part III(B) explores what our society might look like if state govern-
ments extricated themselves from the business of privileging
relationships and instead invested their resources in privileging individu-
al providers.
thing with which they can, if they choose, express themselves and constitute their
identities.").
291. Robson, supra note 28, at 777-800 (discussing "compulsory matrimony").
292. Robson, supra note 28, at 798 (commenting on David Cruz's account of marriage's
expressive capacity).
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A. Abolishing American Civil Marriage
Civil marriage, in privileging those who enter sexual partnerships
and embrace religious, heterosexist, and patriarchal identities, unjustifi-
ably deprives individuals of the liberty right to self-determine and of the
equality right to interact without reference to identity-based hierarchies.
Some have suggested that these deprivations might be vitiated by rede-
fining civil marriage; others have suggested that they might be vitiated
by replacing civil marriage with another relationship-centered institu-
tion such as a civil union regime.293 While these suggestions might
succeed in rendering the institution less undemocratic, they will not
succeed in rendering it affirmatively democratic.
The first suggestion-that civil marriage be redefined to conform
to democratic principles-is impossible. It would require eliminating
not only civil marriage's religious, heterosexist, and patriarchal aspects,
but also its narrow focus on long-term sexual partnerships. While we
might succeed in the former, we would almost certainly fail in the latter.
Civil marriage cannot be redefined without amending our legal provi-
sions as well as our social norms, and we cannot realistically hope to
alter our social norms to the point of removing any one of marriage's
three definitional aspects.294 In sum, while we might succeed in eliminat-
ing civil marriage's religious, patriarchal, and heterosexist aspects, we
would not succeed in eliminating its de facto requirements of longevity,
sexuality, and partnership.
The second suggestion-that civil marriage be replaced with an-
other relationship-centered institution such as a civil union regime,
which could potentially be expanded to include non-sexual partner-
ships-would be achievable and preferable, but ultimately still
undemocratic. Entering a civil union would not destroy liberty in as
many ways as entering a civil marriage does (assuming that the term
"civil union" has not yet become inextricably associated with any specific
set of identities).295 It would, however, destroy equality in many of the
293. She writes, "[I]t would be a lot better, as a matter of both political theory and public
policy, if the state withdrew from the marrying business, leaving the expressive do-
main to religions and to other private groups, and offering civil unions to both same-
and opposite-sex couples." Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 672.
294. Civil marriage is not within the unilateral control of state governments. Indeed, it is
only partly defined by state statutes and constitutions. When a state government es-
tablishes "civil marriage," it inevitably invokes a broad set of social norms that are
beyond its own control-and those norms universally entail a focus on sexual part-
nerships that is inherently undemocratic.
295. John R. Schleppenbach, Strange Bedfellows: Why Older Straight Couples Should Advo-
cate for the Passage of the Illinois Civil Union Act, 17 ELDER L.J. 31, 58 (2009) ("Of
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same ways that entering a civil marriage does. States would still be re-
quired to justify awarding benefits to civil unions by illustrating that
they provide substantial social benefits. It is unclear how states could
meet this goal. Being in a relationship does not per se justify govern-
mental benefits; providing for others, as Part IV(B) will argue, is what
justifies benefits.
B. The Post-Marriage Landscape
If civil marriage were abolished as proposed in Part III(A), states
would need to determine how to proceed. Part III(B), to that end,
makes two proposals. First, states should allocate benefits to individual
providers rather than sexual partners; second, states should allow sexual
partners to enter private contracts that would be enforceable to the same
extent that pre-marital agreements are currently enforceable.
The first proposal-that states should allocate benefits to individu-
al providers rather than sexual partners-would result in privileging all
those who could prove that they were supporting others, physically or
financially, regardless of whether their dependents were sexual partners,
children, other relatives, or friends. Each provider would receive benefits
commensurate with the amount of support they were providing. This
would further the state's interests in encouraging individuals to serve as
providers and in privileging individuals who are serving as providers.
These are surely legitimate interests, because they prevent the state from
having to expend its own resources in caring for dependents.
This first proposal would be preferable to civil marriage in at least
two significant ways. First, awarding benefits to individuals rather than
couples-based on provider status rather than marital status-would
result in a more just distribution of resources. It would allow the state to
privilege those who are providers, as opposed to those who are merely
married. Anyone who could illustrate that he or she was serving as a
provider-regardless of the identity of his or her dependent-would
receive benefits. Such a system would likely reduce the number of sexual
partners receiving benefits (though sexual partners who served as pro-
viders would, of course, continue to receive benefits), and increase the
number of other persons receiving benefits. Two sexual partners who
the existing civil unions bills, the Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Ore-
gon bills are expressly limited to same-sex couples. Maine's statute is silent as to
whether heterosexual couples are eligible. California and New Jersey allow opposite-
sex couples to form civil unions, but only if both members are sixty-two or older....
Illinois's proposed statute is the only one that would open up civil unions to all cou-
ples of all sexual orientations, regardless of their age.").
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were caring for the same child would each be entitled to benefits com-
mensurate with the amount of their individual contributions.
Second, this proposal would be preferable to marriage because its
burdens on liberty and equality would be minor in relation to its bene-
fits to society. While it would admittedly encourage individuals to serve
as providers and privilege individuals who did serve as providers-
thereby burdening both liberty and equality-these burdens would be
justified because they would confer substantial benefits on society. They
would, indeed, ensure that all citizens had access to the basic resources
needed to develop their own identities and interact as equals-which, as
discussed in Part II, is a prerequisite of democracy.
The second proposal-that states should allow sexual partners to
enter legally enforceable private contracts fixing the terms of their rela-
tionships and making arrangements for their dissolution-would be
preferable to marriage because, while many couples currently enter mar-
riage without any knowledge of their statutory rights and obligations
regarding property, support, and child custody, this proposal would re-
quire all couples to take the initiative to create their own agreements. In
doing so, it would likely increase the incidence with which couples de-
fine the terms of their own relationships, and thereby increase
individuals' awareness of the terms to which they are agreeing. This
transition to a regime governed by private contracts rather than default
statutory provisions might not be as radical or difficult as some might
expect, since many couples already contract around the default marriage
and divorce laws by entering pre-marital agreements.296
CONCLUSION
This Article is aimed at improving our democracy. It exposes mar-
riage as an inherently coercive and hierarchical institution. Marriage is
coercive in the sense that it encourages us to adopt religious, heterosexu-
al, and gendered identities; it is hierarchical in the sense that it privileges
those who acquiesce in adopting those identities. While the coercive
nature of marriage deprives us of the liberty to self-determine, its hierar-
296. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Exist-
ence, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 370 n.464 (2004) ("Though data on
prenuptial agreements are hard to obtain because couples are not required to register
the agreements, it is estimated that only five to ten percent of marrying couples sign
premarital agreements."); Erika L. Haupt, For Better, For Worse, For Richer, For
Poorer: Premarital Agreement Case Studies, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 29, 43
(2002) ("[O]ne commentator indicates that only twenty percent of couples enter
into premarital agreements.").
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chical nature deprives us of the ability to interact as equals-both of
which are prerequisites to a fully functioning democracy. Because mar-
riage cannot realistically be redefined to vitiate these deprivations and
foster the liberty and equality that are crucial to democracy, it should
be abolished. Yet it will not suffice to replace marriage with another
institution designed to recognize a slightly broader set of inter-personal
relationships, such as a civil union or domestic partnership regime.
States should instead allocate their limited resources toward supporting
individuals who provide for others through either physical care-taking or
financial contributions.
Couples or groups who wish to create "marriages" or "unions
should be permitted to do so through private ceremonies without any
legal consequence. Couples or groups who wish to enter legal contracts
establishing the terms of their relationships should also be permitted to
do so, and states should enforce those contracts to the same extent that
they would enforce comparable contracts such as existing pre-marital
agreements. These reforms would, if adopted, enhance our liberty and
equality-and, ultimately, our democracy. t
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